University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014

1943

China and the United States, 1922-1928 ;: how the
administrative problems concerning tariff,
extraterritoriality, and communications affected
diplomatic relationship between China and the
United States.
Mary P. Farrell
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses
Farrell, Mary P., "China and the United States, 1922-1928 ;: how the administrative problems concerning tariff, extraterritoriality, and
communications affected diplomatic relationship between China and the United States." (1943). Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014.
1498.
Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses/1498

This thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses 1911 February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES,
1922-1928

FARRELL

•

1943

CHINA

AND

THE

1922

-

UNITED

STATES,

1928

Hew the Administrative Problems Concerning Tariff,
Extraterritoriality, and Communications Affected
Diplomatic Relationship Between China and the
United States

By

Mary P. Farrel

Thesis submitted for the degree
of Master of Science

Massachusetts State College
Amherst, Massachusetts
May,

1943

SUMKARY

OF

CONTENTS

Page

CHAPTER

I.

CHINA AND THE POWERS, 1842-1928
A.

Encroachments on China's
Administrative Integrity

B.

Attempted Rejuvenation of
Admini ttrat ive Integrity

C.

The Chinese Republic and

1

Administrative Integrity
D.

CHAPTER

II.

Summary

TARIFF

AUTONOMY

CHAPTER III.

EXTRATE RITORIALITY

CHAPTER

IV.

COMMUNICATIONS

104

CHAPTER

V.

CONCLUSION

126

:

APPENDIX

i

41

80

I.

L33

APPENDIX II.

135

BIBLIOGRAPHY

141

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
To Dr.

Cary, Hiss Horrigan,

and Dr. Mohler I express gratitude for
their invaluable assistance as members
of this thesis committee.
do I thank Dr.

Especially

Cary for his guidance in

the selection of the topic and in the

development of the study.

To other

friends who aided this investigation
v/ith

their suggestions I am grateful.

FOREWORD
SIno-Amerlcan relations were based on trade.
Because of the hazardous nature of this commercial

enterprise, however, an additional security was

established by treaty,

Ihe treaty rights which the

United States and other Powers obtained from China in the
middle of the nineteenth century gave legal recognition
to the practise of encroaching

upon China's administrative

and territorial entities.
It is the purpose of this study to present a

small aspect of the history of the administrative relations

between the United States and China.

By taking three

specific phases the tariff, the judiciary, and communications as representative problems of the broader trend,
it will be possible to observe an evolutionary process

of development from 1842-1928.

1.

CHAPTER
CHINA

A.

AND

THE

I.

POWERS, 1842 - 1928.

Encroachments on China's Administrative Integrity
The early relations be Ween China and the Powers

were primarily commercial.

American merchants entered the

China trade at the end of the eighteenth century and

endeavored to fit their enterprise into the scheme of an
essentially hostile customer nation.

For China in her

glorious Isolation merely tolerated foreign traders.

The

sovereignty of the Manchu dynasty was not to be challenged
by the West before 1842 but it was the imposition of this

authority that was a continual source of irritation to the
esterners.
The Chinese had strict regulations for the control
of foreigners.

The contempt they felt for the mercenary
1

merchants was manifested in these regulations.

Imperial

decree had made Canton and Macao the only ports open for
trade.

1.

The Imperial Government had designated certain

Latourette, ''The History of the Early Rel: tlons
Between the United States and China, " Connecticut
Academy of Arts and Sciences , XXII (1917), 19.
K.

3.

authorities to have dealings with the foreigners.

The

Westerners had to live and trade In small areas allotted
to them by the Chinese, %*hich they were not allowed to

leave.

With the exactions levied on foreign products and

the general corruption among Chinese officials,

foreign

traders were working under adverse conditions.
The Westerners felt that this discrimination

plus the refusal of China to recognize their governments
was detrimental to trade.

Moreover, an additional

Irritation was experienced in the administrative conflict
of 0 lental-Occldental law.

The traders complained of

Chinese Jurisdiction, emphasizing the wide difference in

Eastern court procedure from Western.

On the whole the
1

law systems were not too widely divergent.

The Chinese

emphasized the result of an assault and the English
emphasized the intention of a crime.

It was regrettable

that the legal issues concerning free intercourse on a

basis of mutual equality could not have been settled
during the test case of the Terranova Affair.

2

This case

of an American sailor's death by the Chinese authorities

Korse and H. P. MacNair, Far Easttrn International
Relations (Cambridge, 1931), p. 73.
B.

1.

H.

2.

Latourette, "The History of. the E a rly Relations
Between the United States and China," p. 63.
K.

S.

3.

for the allegedly accidental death of a Chinese woman

well Illustrated the legal position of foreigners in

China prior to the 1842 treaties.
The foreign merchants felt that some action

should be taken to establish diplomatic intercourse and
thus insure their collective security for trading by

opening more ports and expanding the volume of trade.

opportunity was soon to present Itself.

An

Merchants of all

nations, including the United States, supplied China with

opium to

>?a.ln

a favorable balance of trade.

There was a

need for a China market commodity to offset the specie

basis of trade which resulted from China's not importing
foreign goods to an appreciable extent.

The importation of

opium into China, howevc r, had been illegal and therefore
tax free since 1796 and was a profitable contraband product.
The opium Wars were solely between China and Great
3

Britain over the drug traffic.

*

The Canton authorities had

overtly supported the trade since its prohibition, but in
1839 a sudden reform administration had seized all the

opium in Canton without warning.

The lack of warning and

the subsequent loss of 36,000,000 worth of oolum was the

primary British objection.

However, it was strictly Britain

struggle because she had refused to give bond to the Chinese

1.

Latourette, "The History of the Early Relations
Between the United States and China," p. 110.

K.

3.

!

s

4.

Government not to introduce any more opium.

British gunboats quickly subdued the Chinese,
and a Treaty of Peace and Commerce
in 1842.

x*as

signed at Nanking

It was incomprehensible to the Chinese that a

conquering power that had force would not use it to its
fullest extent.

2

However, the seemingly mild Treaty of

Nanking granted the privilege of extraterritoriality but
did not settle the question of opium importation.

Whenever a British subject has reason to
complain of a Chinese he must first proceed
to the Consulate and state his grievance....
regarding the punishment of English criminals,
the English Government will enact the laws
necessary to attain that end, and the Consul
will be empowered to put them in force.... 3
Further concessions were exacted by the British.
were given

a

Consuls

status to communicate on terms of equality

with Chinese officials, provision was made for the
Imperial Government to promulgate a "fair and regular

tariff of import and export customs and other dues;" and
four ip ore Chinese ports were opened to trade.

Latourette, "The History of the Early Relations
Between the United states and China, " p. 113.

1.

K.

S.

2.

R.

Y.

3.

W.

4.

4

Gilbert, Muit's Wronfl

China? (New York, 1927, p. 202.

Wllloughby, Foreign Rights and
(Baltimore, 1920), pp. 19-iiO.
G.

W.

N.

I nterests in

China

(Boston, 1936), p.53!
Steiger, A History of the Far East

5

When other nations saw Britain concluding a
treaty that would facilitate commerce i*lth China they

successfully opened negotiations themselves.

The

treaties signed between China and the foreign Powers in
the next two years were known as the First Treaty

Settlement.

They determined the Chinese-Western relations

until 1858 and represented the first measures of

administrative encroachment on China's Judicial and
revenue systems.
It has been contended that the United States

reaped profit 'vhlle the British fought the Opium

'/ars.

In

view of our commercial policy this is not a just accusation.
..'e

would not Join in a forceful expedition for a privilege

that the American merchants had been willing to give up

voluntarily by signing the bond at the request of the
Chinese Government.

Later we pledged ourselves to this

policy by declaring in the Treaty of 1844, opium to be
contraband.
The Am rican treaty was much better than the

British in obtaining privileges for its citizens.

The

treaty definitely claimed extraterritorial Jurisdiction.
The American delegate, Cushing, had been Instructed to

support the doctrine that Americans in China should not be
subject to the laws and courts of China.
1.

W.
p.

W.

15.

1

He asked for

Willoughby, Foreign Rights and Interests in China ,

2

6.

extraterritoriality on a basis of international
not as a concession from the Chinese.

lav;

and

However, the legal

existence of extraterritorial rights rested entirely upon

concessions made by China in her treaties with the Western
Powers."*"

Subjects of China who may be guilty of any
criminal act towards citizens of the United
States shall be arrested and punished by the
Chinese authorities according to the laws of
China; and citizens of the United States who
may commit any crime in China shall be subject
to be tried and punished only by the Consul
or other public functionary of the United States,
thereto authorized according to the laws of the
United States. And in order to the prevention
of all controversy and disaffection, Justice
shall be equitably and impartially administered
on both sides.
All questions in regard to rights whether of
property or person arising between citizens of
the United States in China, shall be subject to
the Jurisdiction of, and regulated by the
authorities of their own government. And all
controversies occurring in China between
citizens of the United States and subjects of
any other Government shall be regulated by the
treaties existing between the United States and
such governments, respectively, without
interference on the part of China. 9

1.

2.

W.
p.

V.

Willoughby, Foreign Rights and Interests in China ,

17.

Treaties. Conventions, International Aots ,
Protocols, and Ass ignments between the United St- Lc s and
QtKeTTowers. I^6 ->L6u9 (Washington, l&iO), I, 2QS-Su3.
W.

M. Malloy,

A Treaty of Peking signed by China and the
United States in 1880 further defined extraterritorial

privileges for the United States.

Consular Jurisdiction

In civil cases was granted to American nationals.

When controversies arise in the Chinese
Empire between citizens of the United
States and subjects of His Imperial Majesty
which need to be examined and decided by the
public officers of the two nations, it is
agreed between the Governments of the United
States and China that such will be tried by
the proper official of the nationality of the
defendant.
The properly authorized official
of the plaintiff's nationality, shall be freely
permitted to attend the trial and shall be
,
treated with the courtesy due to his position....
Another instance whereby the Powers violated
Chinese administration was in the creation of the Mixed
Court at Shanghai in 1864.

The Court was to hear litigation

In both Chinese and Western law and Chinese and foreign

Jurists were to preside over the Court.

Rules were

formulated and from 1876 on Jurisdiction was based on the
principle, "the cases tried by the official of the

defendants nationality...., the law administered will be the
law of the nationality trying the case.

1.
2.

.

M.

Malloy, Treaties ,

I,

240.

Morse and H. F. MacNair, Far Eastern International
Relations , p. 261.
H.

B.

8.

In theory, the laws of the Chinese Empire were

supreme and foreigners were bound to respect them.

In

practise, foreigners were bound to respect Chinese law
only as it conformed to the laws of their home countries.
tbm difference was bound to create animosity.

The American

Government, according to Secret -ry of State Seward, tried
to reconcile the theory and practise of the Kixed Court.

It does not seem necessary or possible to
abandon the simple proposition that our people

may be dealt with only in our own courts and
according to our own lavs. But so far as we
can hold language to the Chinese which will
indicate that \te stand upon their soil in an
attitude of respect with a determination to
sustain the government in the essential
I maintain only
attributes of soFereignty,
that we ought not
the views of my government
to withhold such language nor fail to sustain
it in practise by appropriate action whenever
the occasion may arise.
. .

—

.

.

j-

The Treaty of 1844 was signed to facilitate peace,

amity, and commerce and contained the nucleus of the most-

favored-nation clause and prescribed a fixed tariff.
Citizens of the United States resorting to
China for the purpose of comrerce will pay
the duties of import and export prescribed
in the tariff which is fixed and made part of
They shall In 10 case be subject
this treaty.
to other or higher duties than are or shall be
required of the people of any other nation
'

1.

"J.

p.

V/.

42.

-iilloughby,

Foreign Rights and Interests in China

,

9.

whatever
And If additional advantages
or privileges of whatever description, be
conceded hereafter by China to any other
nation, the United States, and the citizens
thereof, shall be entitled thereupon to a
complete, enual and impartial participation
in the same.l

France and Russia also concluded treaties vith

China at this time.

In the Russian treaty a special

rebate of one third percent on regular import and export
duties was pranted on overland and frontier trade.

2

The

purpose of this measure was to encourage the overland
caravan trade.

However, by the most-favored-natlon clause

other nations claimed the same privilege, and with the
event of the railroad, the Powers benefited by it greatly.
The Manchu throne accepted the new relationship

which had been established between China and the foreign

FowerB in these treaties but not all of China acceded.
Canton became the center of anti-foreign friction caused by

Chinese resentment and foreign violation of the treaty
rights.

H.

1.

2.

3.

3

kalloy,

Treaties ,

I,

197.

Arnold, tariffs and Internal Taxes," China |
Commercial and Industrial Handbook (Washington, 1926),

J.

pT

334.

G.

8.

Steiger, A History of the Far East , p. 538.
.

10.

As a result of dissatisfaction and the recourse
to forceful settlement,

the foreign Powers signed the

Second Treaty Settlement between 1858-1860.

This extended

foreign control over residence, trade, and diplomatic

representatives in Peking.

The original treaties had

expired about this time, and the Chinese Government had
been inclined to refuse to sign renewals.

Great Britain

and France won their rights by force in the Second Anglo-

French War, while the United States gained further eonoess
ions. through diplomacy.
In this Settlement the American Treaty clearly

stated the principle of the most- favored-nation treatment.

China's incompetence, then, would enable the Powers to
form a bloc against her through terras of this provision.^*
The contracting parties hereby agree that
3h raid at any time, the Ta T'sing I&aplre grant
to any nation, any right, privilege or f ivor,
connected either with navigation, commerce,
political or other Intercourse, which is not
conferred by this treaty, such right privilege
and favor shall at once freely inure to the
benefit of the United 3tates, its^publlc
officers, merchants and citizens.

1.

2.

«How China Recovered Tariff Autonomy/
Aneric^n Academy of Political and Social Scienc e,
CLII (November, 1930), 267.
C.

C.

Wang,

M.

HallPjr,

Tr--.fi

ties ,

I,

221.

11

Discontent with mi 8 government and with China's

increasing contact with the West, religious fanaticism,
and revolutionary secret societies caused an uprising

ecainet the Manchus.

China was disrupted by the T'aiping

Rebellion from 1850-1860.

The Powers co-operated during

the rebellion to carry out the American policy of

supporting the Imperial authorities, thus staving off

dismemberment of the Empire which might have followed the
success of the T'aipingg.
The Revolutionists had threatened to seize the

Imperial administration at Shanghai and the Powers united
to prevent this action by further encroachment upon China's

administrative integrity.

The Ar.trloan, British, and French

Consuls at Shanghai agreed to establish a Customs Office

under foreign control to collect the tariff of import and
export dues for the Imperial Government .

The Hanchu ruler

approved of this action as an expedient measure.

Continua-

tion of the collection then came about because the

arrangement proved satisfactory to both foreign traders and
the Chinese Government.

Foreign concessions and the experience of inter-

mittent warfare with France on her Southern boundary led
the Chinese Government to build telegraph lines and to

foster communications improvements within the Empire.
1.

The

Oowen and J. W. Hall, An Outline History of China
(New York, 1927), p. 293.

H.

H.

12.

first steam railroad was also constructed by the British

about this time.

In the face of foreign development, the

Manchus endeavored to have a foreign policy th

t

would

prevent complete administrative control by treaty powers.
Hie Chinese Foreign Office issued a circular in 1878

explaining its policy.

In general it agreed in the

efficacy of most- favored-nation treatment but complained
of the abuses in the system whereby nations would Interpret

concessions gained through the most- favored-nation clauses
to their own advantage.

The Smolre had never been restored to its supreme

position after the T'alping Rebellion.

Dissension that had

existed within the Empire before it had assumed treaty
obligations was now accentuated.

Anti-Manohu revolutionary

societies, robbery and brigandage, anti-Christian demonstrations, and official corruption ware all significant factors

in the decadence of the Empire.

The Manchus, however,

managed to maintain the respect of the West for three
decades after the Second Treaty Settlement in spite of

encroachments on their administrative and territorial

integrity and rampant domestic turmoil.

1

Finally the

Chinese-Japanese controversy over China's vassal state,
Korea, broke the feeble hold of Manohu prestige at home and

1.

G.

N.

Steiger, History. of the Far East , p. 560.

s

.

13.

abroad
Japan had been trying to "open" Korea to

commercial enterprise ever since she started on her own

path of Westernization.

The Japanese succeeded in signing

a commercial treaty with Korea in 1676.

This treaty

Japan's first step in expansion on the mainland. 1

if

as

From

this time on Japan worked toward destroying China*

suzerainty over Korea.
Western nations had contributed to China's

humiliation by Japan because they interfered in Korea by
signing commercial treaties,

too,

and thus they stimulated

anti-f oreigniem and Chinese- Japanese rivalry.

culminated in war in 1894.

This rivalry

The period after the var marked

the ascendency of Japan as a Far Eastern Power and started

China on her precipitous courae of reform and revolt,

heightened by foreign aggression against her administrative
and territorial sovereignty.
The disgrace China had to bear after the Japanese
war brought forth an Immediate reaction.

r

It started among

the educated classes with a demand for administrative

The first expressions of dissatisfaction were in

reform.

the form of memorials to the throne containing proposals for

1.

Horse and H.
Relations, p. 389.
H.

3.

F.

MaoHalr, Far

Sr. g

tern Int

bl

saal

14.

reform and protests against ratification of the Treaty
of
Shimonosekl.
formed.

Societies to propagate reform were quickly

The Infiltration of new Ideas Inevitably became

revolutionary and this movement

\*as

ably led by 3un Yat-3en,

chief of the revolutionary party.

Another phase of reform emphasized constitutional
revision.

The Emperor, Kuang Hsu, became an adherent of

this mode of strengthening the Empire against foreign

encroachment.

He tried to Institute the ohange by a aeries

of reform decrees In 1898.

There was an element of pathos

in the failure of the Smperor's decrees.

The haste which he

felt was necessary was, in reality, a mistalce.

The entire

project was too ambitious for a man ignorant of administrative
procedure and unable to inspire followers.

The program

proved to be too revolutionary for ancient Chinese tradition
to assimilate.

The reform decrees alarmed the Manchus who turned
to the Dowager Empress,

element at court.

Tzu Hsi, who favored the conservative

The Emperor, meanwhile, went too far

with his reform and planned a revolution which would dispose
of the Dowager's influence and destroy the conservative party.

Ihe Empress heard of the plot and immediately executed a

coup d'etat, dethroned the Emperor, and resumed the regency.

15,

China,

emerging from

ar with Japan, had to

contend with new encroachments on her sovereignty.
Private individuals backed by their governments exploited
China with the avidity of inseparable combinations.

1

The result of this merging of individual with
governmental lnt rests has been that matters
which would elsewhere be of merely comnereial
character, susceptible of Judicial determination
in case of dispute, are in China matters of
international political concern, for the
settlement of which the ultimate recourse is to
diplomatic notion.
It is thus in a sense true
thnt the international status of the Chinese
Government is determined and conditioned by its
business contracts with individual foreign firms
or syndlcrtr -q, scarcely if at all less than by
its formal Trer-tles with other Governments. 2

This situation was emphasised when China vai forced
to admit foreign capital to pay the indemnity to Japan and

was forced, al30, to grant territorial concessions to the

A

Powers who had helped lighten the 3himonosekl terms.

double burden was thereby placed upon the defeated nation.
The first Power to

March 6, 1090.

{jet

a lease was Germany, Klachow on

Bus sift leased Port Arthur, April

V
ooncerninr; China , 1894-1919 (Hew

J.

'd,

Ioid.

,

p.

xv.

v-'ork,

2;

Britain

19*1), 1, :dil.

18.

leased Weihaiwei, April 10; France leased Kwang-chow wan,
June 9; and Britain obtained more land on the Kowloon

Peninsula.
While the scramble for concessions was going on
In 1898, the United States was busy with war with Spain.

The next year, when the question of the annexation of the

Philippines came before the American Government the islands
were looked upon by many as a base for the China trade.
The new imperialism in the United States was soon
to be applied to Ohina.

Through the close relations among

the members of the American and British 3tate Department s,"*"
the American Secretary of State, John Hay, was persuaded to

send identic notes to the Po ers requesting their support

in upholding equal commercial opportunities in China.

These

notes gave expression to the American heritage of the

principle of an open door for trade in China plus the socalled co-operative policy to maintain it.

The diplomacy

was enacted to prevent the probable partition of China

among the Powers who had received territorial concessions.
The Chinese Government was not invited to partake in the

correspondence.
"/hile

Hay w&* announcing the Open- Door principle,

the Chinese Government was preparing to resist by force
1.

united
r lswold, The b'ar astern Policy of t he
States (New York, 1938), pp. 64-63.

A.

•

;;

1?

further foreign aggression.

A general spirit of unrest

was characterized by antl-f orelgnlsra, anti-missionary

demonstrations, and anti-reformation activity.
the impress

1

To promote

reactionary policy of preserving the Empire

by strengthening old institutions and denying further

foreign concessions, the throne encouraged roving Militia

bands and patrl jtic societies called Boxers.

The movement

gained momentum and finally became dangerous to the life
and property of foreigners in China.
the Impress to suppress the Boxers.

"The

legations ordered

This request, however,

was ignored.
The Manchu support of the anti-foreign movement

played into the hands of the Powers and presented a perfect
opportunity for then to enlarge their spheres of Influence.

Partition of China was again threatened and Hay sensed the
need for a more forceful measure of insuring commercial
equality.

Accordingly, he sent a circular note to the Powers

July 3, 1900 , declaring that it was the policy of the United
M

States,

entity..

.

to preserve Chinese territorial and administrative

.and safeguard for all the world the principle of

equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese
iftpire. i±
"

1.

Or.

N

.

3teiger, A HisLory of the F a r

p.

694.

18.

The Hay statement gradually assumed the

character! sties of an American policy, a means of defense
for China.

It meant the intervention by the United States

in a region where American interests were always

comparatively small.

The United States was thereby

committed to a policy it could hardly hope to defend in
view of the American public's reluctance to use force and
the repercussion of European realpolitik in China.

Meanwhile suspicion had been aroused in China when
foreign marines and naval forces we

legations and foreign nationals.

:*e

landed to protect the

The War Party at court

succeeded in declaring; a state of war between China and the
out3ide

itforld.

In the ensuing conflict, atrocities were

committed by both sides but the foreign forces were
victorious. Of ficials in the Central and Southern Provinces,

notoriously anti-Manchu, refused to obey war orders from

Peking and this neutrality kept the Boxer Rebellion from
becoming of greater proportion.

The United States joined

an Allied expedition to relieve the besieged legations in

Peking and this punicive force brought the uprising to an
end.

The Powers then united to impose a diplomatic settle-

ment upon the Chinese Government for the damage done by
the Boxers.

The Povcrs sirned a Pe^ce Protocol

!-rith

China In

10.

1901.

By the terras of this agreement, an Indemnity of

four hundred and fifty millions of Halkwan Taela was

charged to China.

1

A bond issue was floated to pay the

indemnity, security for the bonds being assigned to

different sources of national revenue.

Terms of the

Protocol wore lightened for China by the United States
in 190 8 when Congress adopted a resolution providing for
the remission of a portion of the American share of the

Boxer indemnity .

Upon final adjudication it was found that

the claims of American nationals totaled less than the

apportioned amount of the indemnity.

The remittance was

a gesture of friendship to set up a fund for the education

of Chinese youth.
The British signed a treaty with China in 1902

revising commercial treaties as had been provided in the
Boxer Protocol.

The United States and Japan followed with

similar treaties a year later.

Terms

of these treaties

were of three types: in the interest of general trade; for
the reform of the Chinese Government; consideration for
the interests of the United States, Gre^t Britain and Japan.

1.

J.

V. A.

MacMurray, Treaties ,

B. Morpe and H.
Help tlon-q, p. 495.
H.

F.

I,

300,

MacNpir, Far Eastern

/>

onal

20

In the American Treaty, proviaion was made for

the abolition of likln.

This tax had been detrimental to

the development of China 8 internal trade as well as a
1

source of annoyance to the Powers.

''Likin"

(meaning

contribution of a thousandth, i.e. one-tenth of one percent)
./as

a tax imposed on goods on inland transit.

Its original

purpose had been to mett the expenditures of the T'alping
Kebellion.

Likln stations were plaoed at all large

and along the main routes of land and water trade.

tov;ns

A

provincial responsibility, generally colleooed by the military
governor, the tax was a source of Irritation to foreign

merchants.

Faulty imposition rendered likin most severe

on railway lines where the specified weight of goods was

recorded and thus the practise of mutual "adjustments"
between trader and likin official were made cumbersome.
The United States allowed China compensation for abolishing

this means of revenue:

....The Government of the United States in return,
consents to allow a surtax, in exoesB of the
tariff rates for the time bein& in force, to
be imposed on foreign goods imported by
citizens of the United States and on Chinese
produce destined for export abroad or coastwise.
It Ifl clearly understood that in no
case shall the surtax on foreign goods exoeed
one and one half time8 the import duty leviable

1.

J.

Arnold,

"Tariff*? and Internal Taxes", p.

339.

21

in terms of the final Protocol signed by
China and the Povrers....!

America was dictating administrative policy to
China that she was treaty bound to uphold.

Nevertheless,

the principle of Chinese sovereignty was duly accredited.

Nothing in this article is Intended to interfere
with the inherent right of China to levy such
other taxes as are not in conflict with its
provisions.... 2
The promise of relinquishing extraterritoriality

was Included in this trnnty.

China and the

Po--<rrs

had been

in dispute over law and Jurisdiction since the beginning

of the nineteenth century.

The (lovernment of China having expressed a
strong desire to reform its Judicial syst<
and to bring it Into accord with that of the
Western nations, the United States agrees to
give every assistance to such reform and will
also be prepared to relinquish extraterritoriality
rights when satisfied that the state of the
Chinese laws, the arrangements for their
administration and oth^r conditions war ant it
.
in so doing.
<->

.

.

Accordingly, Chinese

laxv

reform cornmenoed as a

fulfillment of the term a of the Treaties of 1902 and 1903.

1.
!

.

3.

».

..alloy,
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Loo,

clt .

Ibid.

.

p.

269.

Treaties,

I,

:363.

Legal reform was to be a gradual process.
was promulgated in 1907. 1

A criminal code

A body of Rules for the

application of Foreign Laws was later formulated.

In

keeping with its power, the Congress of the United States
tried to correct the evils of the extraterritorial system
in China by oreating the United States Court for China in

1906.

This Court had exclusive Jurisdiction in all oases

and Judicial proceedings that came within the scope of
the extraterritoriality system.

The surface reform instituted by the Throne was

farcical.

Letting the Empress and her court return after

the Peace Protocol was signed was a mistake for which China
•aid have to

pay in ml aery and suffering.

constitutions and codes of

lav/

The fad for

that the Throne promulgated

in the last days of its existence was mistaken for the

represent a Give attitude of the Chinese mind.

On the other

hand, reformers and many high ranking officials wore

sincerely desirous of having a constitutional monarchy and

wanted neither revolution nor reaction.

1.

"Extraterritoriality in China",
American Journal of International Law , XX (January,
H.

19
.

H.

3.
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J,
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'4uigley,
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Gilbert,
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«g Wron,^

;ith Chin* ?*, p. 23".
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Yet Revolutionary activity was being oarrled out
all the time by Sun

Y-

t-3cn and his followers.

A s the

prestige of the Manchus began to fall after the Boxer
Revolt, the aroused patriotism of the people became more

and more favorable to revolution.*

Failure of the revolt

plus the helplessness of China In 1904, when Japan and

Russia fought on her soil, convinced the most conservative
that the way to avoid national ruin was through reor^anlza-

tlon and the adoption of western ideas.
The opening decade of the twentieth century in

China was characterized by reform, revolt, and revolution.
The movement for constitutional government plus the decrying

Manchu dynastic authority in Peking were supplemented by

agitation for provlncipJL autonomy in the South and

'/est.

The provinces were resisting the Central Governm-- nt 1 s

railway policy of nationalization.

They objected to the

strength the Man onus would receive from foreign loans, the

centralized railway system, and the loss of revenue that
they would experience in this system.

Passive resistance in the form of a strike aaalnst

Hsu, 3un Yat-Sen His Poll
(Los Angles, I9u7>), p. 59.

1.

L.

2.

K.

b.

i

al and .Social gdg ag

Latourette, The Chinese. Their History an d Culture
(New York, 1934;, p. 427.
S.
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the railroad project in Szechwan province initiated the

revolution.

Revolutionary plots

x^rere

then uncovered in

many of the provinces and fighting and rioting broke out.
?ha persistence of the revolutionaries, the conservatism of
the Manchus, and the neutrality of the Powers in refraining

from making a loan to the Empire brought about the downfall
of the Manchu dynasty in 1911.

A Republic was proclaimed for China and Yuan
Shlh-k'al a former Mr.nchu official was elected president.
Yuan's election as permanent executive was a conservative
triumph because the Revolutionary Provisional Parliament

had been dominated by Sur Yat-SenU Nationalist P rty.
Nationalists objected to Yuan Shih-k ai
1

the foreign b'mkinr groups.

1

s

loan policy

The
-ith

This was the Reorganization

Loan Agreement from which the American Bonking; Group with-

drew its support because Wilson considered it to be a threat
to the administrative independence of China.

Though

Parliament and the provinces protested the loan, Yuan
succeeded in forcing the Nationalists to retire from the

Government and he proceeded to set up dictatorial power.
The Kuomintang (National People*s Party) continued as an

active political party in the south and awaited the opportunity
for seizing control of the government.

25.

G.

The Chinese Republic and

Afli

inistrative Into. ;rity

The war in Europe destroyed the balance of pover
In the Far ICast and substituted for It American-Japanese

antagonism. 1

Vfhile

the leading British trade suffered

during the ^ar, Japanese and American commercial enterprise

prospered.

Japan ,howevHr, added territorial and administrative

aggrandizement to her commercial policy by seizing the
German possessions in Shantung.
The Japanese presented the government of China

"ith an ultimatum of twenty-one demands on January 18, 1915,
These demands were for special oonoesslons and privileges
for Japan in Shantung, drawn

vcp

in five groups that brought

forth an immediate note of protest from the United States.
This note had given Japan hope, however, that America would

Inaugurate a China policy more In keeping with Japan's
interests in China.

For in it, Bryan had recognized,

"that

territorial contiguity creates special relations between

Japan and those districts,

H

to which she claimed rights.

The Chinese Government,

2

"with a view to preserving

the peace of the Far East, hereby accepts, with the exception

1.

Oriewoldg F r Eastern Policy of the
p. 176.

2.

Ipid.

A.

W.

fl

,

p.

192.

i

n:ted 3t tea ,

T

.
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of those five articles of Group V postponed for later

negotiations, all the articles

h1

China had successfully

eluded politic -1 vassalage by violating the pledge of
secrecy and informing the United States of the Ultimatum. 2
3uch a step had given her the moral courage to refuse the

fifth category (with the exception of an article concerning

capital for railways, mines, and dockyards) before the

United States had sent a second warning to Tokyo.

In its

second note the policy of the United States seemed to be

stiffening

.

....that it cannot recognize any agreement
or undertaking which has been entered into
or which may be entered into between the
(Jove ^nmonts of China and Japan impairing the
treaty rights of the United States and its
citizens in China, the political or
territorial integrity of the Republic of
China, or the international policy rel tlve
to China commonly known as the Open- Door Policy.

Tliis

was the first expression of the famous non-

recognition policy.

Drafted by Lansing, it accomplished

it | purpose, made Japan doubt the free reign of the Bryan

1.

Srisvold,
p. 193.
A.

W«

F ar Eastern Policy of the United States ,

2.

Paul Blrdsall, Versailles Twenty Years After (New York,
1941), p. 86.

3.

J.

V.

A.

MaoMurray, Treatie s, II, 1^36.
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note and led Tokyo to feel the need of an understanding

with the United States concerning China.

1

Japan, meanwhile,

had assured herself a place at the Peace Conference by
signing the Declaration of London with England, France, and
Russia, agreeing not to make a separate peace.
China, too, was concerned with attending the Peace

Entering the war with the Allies, however,

Conference.

was more than the simple reply to Wilson's call to the
flenocr icies.

China.

2

Public opinion on the

ar

wr-s

divided lB

The Peking Government wanted financial assistance

and treaty revision from the Powers as the price for China's

Chinese merchants were opposed to war because

entrance.

trade as a neutral nation was extremely profitable.

Kuomlntang leaders feared the suppression of constitutionalism
and control by the militarists if war were declared.

However,

China's hopes for treaty revision at the Conference preThe President of China disregarded a suggestion
reform
importance
by the United States that internal/was of prime

dominated.

against
for China, dismissed Parliament, and declared war
the

Central Powers August 14, 1917.
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Trf o

years later the Chinese delegates attended

the Paris Conference presenting a united front but
not

representing a united nation, for both North and South had

reconoiled differences merely to attend the Conference. 1
China had one objective and one purpose, restoration of

Germany's possessions and protection from Japan. 2

The

hope was also expressed that the Conference -rould take
steps lending to the eventual removal of other foreign

restrictions upon China's sovereignty.

A list of questions

for readjustment was submitted calling for the renunciation
of all spheres of influence or interest, the withdrawal of

foreign troops and police, foreign post offices and agencies
for wireless and telegraphic conmmle-ttion, the abolition
of consular Jurisdiction,

the relinquishment of the leased

territories, and the restoration of foreign concessions and

settlements and tariff autonomy.

3

Wilson sounded Lloyd George on a proposal that
all Po/ers forego their special rights in China but the

1.

MaoNair, "Political History of China Under the
Republic, " American Academy of Political and social
Science CLII (November, 1930), 217.
H.

F.

,

2.

Morse and H.
Relations , p. 602.
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Ibid.
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MacHair, Far Eastern International

^

29.

British Government did not agree.

w hen

the case of

Shantung came up for discussion, the legal and diplomatic
strength of the Japanese claim, plus the bargaining

power of the race question in the League, were potent
enough to defeat China.
News of the Shantung decision brought forth a
student and coolie demonstration of protest in China.

The

defeat was a humiliation for both North and South but it

was to have a positive effect on Southern Nationalism.
Increasing dissatisfaction In the Southern Provinces where

republican and constitutional thought was inclined to be
radical had led to the convocation of the members of the

Peking Parliament at Canton in 1920.

The Canton Government

then sought to obtain de facto recognition from the foreign

Powers and the Canton President, Sun Yat-3en, Issued a

manifesto claiming the legitimacy of the Canton regime to
the world at large.

Constitutional development had been retarded in
leadership.
China from lack of executive energy and political

2

given to a
In actual practise the name Republic had been

representative
conglamoration of governments from bandit gangs to

1.

Paul Birdeall, Versailles , p. 109.

2.

V/.

China.
Willoughby, Constitutional gover nment in
(Washington, 1922), p. 33.
V/.

30.

regional bodies.

1

The central theme in Chinese history

of this tine was the evolution of Nationalism.

The South

did not consider that the Resolution had been completed.
fhe Government at Canton adopted the basic principles of
Sun Yat-3en*s Sgn Mln doctrine (Three People's doctrine).

2

It contained the three principles to guide the revolution

and set up a republic in China.

They were nationalism,

democraoy, and economic llvllhood.

The economic well being

of the people was a government obligation to provide food,

clothing,
needs.

shelter, and transportation according to their

Democracy, it was hoped, would evolve from three

political stages of military dictatorship, political
tutelage, and constitutional government.

Nationalism

expressed reslstence to foreign aggression and an opportunity
for treaty revision to re-gain international equality among
the Powers.

The foreign program of the Nationalist Party was

based on the principle of Nationalism.

The objective was

treaties.
not antl-foreignisra but pro-abrogation of unequal

Treaty revision on the basis of reciprocity and equality

U

P.

M. A. Llnebarger,

The China of Chiang K *al-shek

(Boston, 1941), p. 4.
2.

Willoughby, Constitutional government In China
(Washington 1922), p. 33.

V.

7.
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was desired.

By unequal treaties, the Nationalists meant

those which denied the fundamental rights of a free and
sov reign state, granted leases permitting foreign nations
to exercise dominion in Chinese territory, deprived China

of the regulation and control of Customs and exempted

foreigners from the Jurisdiction of Chinese laws and courts.
It was impossible to separate the problem of Internal

reform from the problem of foreign treaties because of their

interlocking nature.
The Washington Conference in 1922 marked a highlight
in the relations between China and the Po ^rs.

China asked

for treaty revision in accordance with the Nationalist aims

as she had in 1019.

The hope and promise for revision and

administrative autonomy reouested in 1922 were to become

Involved in domestic turmoil of the post- Conference period.
China experienced violent civil war from 1925-1927.

Anti-

foreign agitation became active in this endeavor to bring
China back to her full sovereign position.
The Revolution to which Sun Yat-Sen had devoted

his life was greatly strengthened by popular demonstrations

between Chinese and foreigners.

Radical labor organizers

and
led strikes and instigated boycotts against the British

Japanese in 1925.
The textile mill strikes of this year were both

32

political and economic.

They were associated with anti-

foreignlsra and were also protestations against the foul

working conditions imposed by the British and Japanese
mill owners.

The student agitation against Tuan Qii-Jui ,

s

(pro- Japanese) Peking Government was an accusation against

imperialism.

That the executive did not suppress the

agitation had an important effect In Shanghai.

H re strikers

were dispersed when the Settlement police fired into the
crowd and killed several Chinese.
The Chinese Government seized upon this "massacre"

as a chance to re-open a diplomatic campaign for the ful-

fillment of old demands and to bring about the re-ad J us tine nt
1

of treaty relations on the basis of national desires.

The Peking Government sent a note to the Power s demanding}
the right of Chinese laborers to vote for the appointment

staff; the
a Chinese member on the Hongkong legislative

of

representareturn of the Mixed Court at Shanghai and Chinese
Settlement;
tion on the Municipal Council of the International

abolition of
and a request for treaty revision and the
response
extra-torrltoriality. the attitude of the Powers in

generally conciliatory
to tliis note of June 24, 1925, was

1.

E.
p.

0. Hauser,

155.

Shanghai; Cit y for Sale (New York, 1940),
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as

cm

be seen from Britain's turning her concessions in

Hankow and Kluklang over to the Nationalists and the Powers

preparing to convene the tariff conference and extraterritoriality commission as provided at Washington in 1922.
^his same year a re-organization conference was

held in an endeavor to bring Sun Yat-Sen (Canton) and
Chang Tso-lin (Manchuria) to the support of Tuan Chi- Jul
(Peking).

The plan failed with the death of Sun, and the

Civil war resumed in

Manchurian war lord withdrei*.

Northern China, and the Manchurian tuchun succeeded in
def e ting the Peking forces.

Civil Government was suspended

in Peking, and a military dictatorship was established under
Chang- Tso-lin.

Meanwhile the N.-itionallst army captured Nanking
on their march northward from Canton.

While troops of the

Peking Government were evacuating the city, units of the
Nationalist army attacked foreigners and foreign property.
This incident caused a breach between the Moderates and

Radicals in the Nationalist Party.

The friction with the

Moscow Communists in the Kuomlntang had been coming since
the Nationalist General

1926.

In January of that year,

-Chiang

K»ai-shek broke relations with his Russian adviser

1.

Howland, Survey of American Foreign Relatic
(New Haven, 1930), p. 139.

CP.

1

34.

Borodin.

In March there was an an ti- Communist purge in

Canton but by the next month money was advanced by Borodin
to win Chiang back temporarily.
^ .nl:ov

J

The Government moved to

in December and by the following

'..pel

,l?f

tfeg

Radicals attempted to discredit Chiang by staging the
nking affair.

I

The policy of patl^Rt conciliation which the Powers
1

had adopted toward China changed abruptly.

An identic

note of protest was sent to the Nationalists demanding

punishment, apology, and reparation.
not favorable.

The Chinese reply was

The Nationalists dwelled upon "unequal

treaties" as the real cause of danger to foreigners.

They

expressed willingness to make good damages after an impartial
investigation had been made to place the blame where it
belonged.
Some of the

Bowers desired Joint military

measures, but at this stage of negotiation, the United States

withdrew $nd the demand for reprisals accordingly dropped.
This action Influenced the course of treaty revision in
favor of diplomacy and peaceful negotiation.

was agreeable to both North and South Qilna.

1.

2.

R.
p.

T.

Such action
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Pollard, China's Foreign Relations (New York, 1933)

304.
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Peking Government had concluded treaties with Austria and
Finland concerning commerce and diplomatic exchange.
Another sovereign triumph of the year was made In a treaty

with Belgium whereby China gained the right to terminate
agreements by

unilateral action, the Belgian Treaty of

1865 was revised by this process.
On the military front the Nationalists were moving

on toward Shanghai.

An expeditionary force of 20,000 British,

American, French, Japanese, Belgian, Italian, Dutch, and

Spanish troops was ready to protect foreign interests.
The need of money for

Ms

army cause General Chiang K'ai-shek

to ask Chinese bankers In Shanghai for a loan.*

Their

reluctance to have any connection with Bolshevism brought
forth a refusal to finance Chiang.

2

Finally

T.

V.

Soong,

capable Cantonese banker, convinced Chiang to break relations

with the Communists and ally with the bankers.

'/hen

the

transaction took place and the selge of 3hanghai lifted, the
British expeditionary force reaped sole credit for the
4

preservation of peace.

Chiang had the resources to set up

a new non-Communistic Government at Nanking.

The Chinese

Communist Party was forced to submerge but was net wiped out.
It was felt by many of Chiang* s Party that his compromise with
the Po-k rs and the compradore diplomats brought his new
5
them.
upon
dependence
into
Nanking Government

Hausrr, Shanghai , p. 167.
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D.

The history of China 1

s

administration shows a

continuous conflict between the treaty Powers and China
for control of administrative functions.

The first instance of administrative encroachment

by the foreign Powers was the low tariff rate in the

prescribed schedules of the treaties in the First Treaty
Settlement.

The inclusion of extraterritorial Jurisdiction

for foreigners In this Settlement and in further extensions

of the right were other violations of Chinese administrative

entity.

Economic exploitation and territorial aggrandizement were at their height after the Chinese- Japanese war.
The fundamental weakness of the Manchu regime made this

foreign aggression possible.

Western wealth and organization

also proved too powerful for Republican China to regain the

sovereign rights surrendered by the Empire.

The interlocking

forces of foreign diplomacy and business rendered the new

China impotent.

China's great liability in the matter of attaining

satisfactory treaty revision was disunity in the ReDublio

between the worth and South.

Civil war merely made the

Powers more anxious to retain their hold on Chinese administration.

37.

China presented her demands for treaty revision
to the Powers at the Peace Conference in 1919 and they went

unheeded.

Again in 1922 at the Washington Confe. once, the

xiationalist alias were presented to the Powers.

For Worth

and South united, in one respect, for treaty revision.

The

unity China manifested before the world at large at the

Washington Conference is the introductory element in this
study of administrative problems.
The primary purpose of the Washington Conference

was for the consideration oi disarmament, thus lessening
the possibility of war In the Pacific rather than to bringing

relief to China.

It was not expected that China would

oouain all sh* ft**lr#d because uhe ^id not

a,,vq

k

,.;

..rn-

mental organization to defend attacks upon her sovereignty.
Ifef

discussion of the Far Eastern Question was supplemental

to the question of devising a method of limiting armament.

Although China asked the Conference to accept ten
points of principles and general policies for procedure
that would Insure her sovereignty, the Powers substituted

Incorporated
the Root Resolutions as blanket policy to be
in the Nine Power Treaty concerning China.

Mr. Root looked

Intentions
upon the "resolutions as an expression of present

and purposes

1.

ttl

The fourth resolution, initiated by

g^ate Document ,
-Conference on the Limitation of Armament' ,
1922), p. 457.
vol. X, 67th Cong., 2d Sees. (Washington,

38.

the American delegation was a diplomatic victory for China

that calmed her fears that further encroachments were
1
contemplated against Chinese sovereignty.
(4) To refrain from taking advantage of the

present conditions In order to seek
special right 3 or privileges which would
abridge the rights of the subjects or
citizens of friendly states and from
countenancing action inimical to the
security of such states."
The well publicized Shantung controversy was

settled outside the Conference.

The Japanese treaties of

1915 were abro ated, Kiachow was restored, and modifications

were made in Japan»s "vested rights* in Shantung.

A Nine Power Treaty was signed among the United
States, Belgium, Great Britain, China, France, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands, and Portugal defining principles and

policies to be followed In matters concerning China.

This

treaty was the most ambitious attempt by the Powers to help

Chinese rehabilitation.

3

Lack of co-operation in carrying

out these principles and policies was to give the obligation

1.

W.
p.

W. Willoughby,

China at the Conference (Baltimore, 1922),

43.

2.

"Conference on the Limitation of Armament", Senate
Documents , p. 460.

3.
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"Can Nations Co-operate in the Rehabilitate
:?uolal Spl ence,
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CLII (November, 1930 ), ;54M.
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Holoorabe,
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of reform in China to the Chinese themselves.

Signing the Washington treaties did not mean
that the United States had decided to abandon its
2
interests in China.
Hughes applied a traditional policy
of retreat because he, like Roosevelt, realized that

America would not fight for the preservation of the
territorial or administrative Integrity of China.

The

reason was veil known, American commerce and investment
were never overwhelmingly large In China.

Thus other

Pow-rs were invited to make our announced policy multilateral.

The African Government had an interest at stake

for it had to evaluate the need for protecting business
interest.^ in China or the prestige to be gained from

potential but not actual force.

By inviting other Powers

to share the principle of upholding the Open-Door, the

United State 8 seemed to emerge from the conference with
a policy that compromised the issue of upholding Chinese

Integrity and supporting American investment in China.
China made specific demands at the Conference for

administrative autonomy which were not recognized as such
by the Powers.

Th© Conference members met the flat request

"Can Nations Co-op r rate in the
American Academy of Political
Rehabilitation of China?
and -Social Science , OLII (November, 1930 J, 350.

1.

A.

N.

2.
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W.
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%

Grlswold, F>r Eastern Policy of the Uni ted
321.

r>l;.tes,
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for tariff autonomy evasively by providing for measures
to increase the tariff yield and apply the surtax

promised in 1903.

China maintained no hope that extra-

territoriality would be abolished in 1922.

However, she

asked that steps be taken toward the eventual relinquishment of the right and she was rewarded with the promise
of a commission to investigate the Judicial systems.

The

Conference denied China's right to wireless autonomy by
re-af firming the treaty grant given to foreign powers in
the Boxer Protocol in 1901.

Prom the stipulation that the

Powers could keep communications open between Peking and
the sea, wireless stations had been built by foreign

companies in China and supported by foreign governments.

41

CHAPTER
TARIFF
M

II.

AUTONOMY

Immediately or as soon as circumstances will

permit, existing limitations upon China's polltioal,

jurisdictional, and administrative freedom of action are
to be removed. w ^

This statement was one of China's ten points of

principle and procedure to be deliberated at the Washington
Conference of 1922.
The first thing that the American delegation did

was to deny the validity of this point.

Mr.

Root, of the

American delegation, maintained that respect for Chinese

sovereignty required respect for the valid agreements China

had made.

2

China had made a series of tariff treaties

limiting herself to five percent customs duty.
re, ;ard,

In this

recognizing China's administrative integrity

involved respect for those limiting treaties.

Legality would

not necessarily, however, preclude modification to help
China.

Root expressed a desire to see agreement among the

Powers to permit China to increase her customs duties.
In answer, Mr. Koo, Chinese representative,

1.

"Conference on the Limitation of Armament," Sen te
Documents , vol. X, 6?th Cong., 2d. Sess. (Washington,
1922), p. 444.

2.

Ibid., p. 457

42.

pointed out that the tariff question was dual in character,

political and technical.

He hoped consideration of the

problem would follow along these lines.

Dr. Koo then asked

for the return to China of the right to tariff autonomy.

China was laboring under the burden of:
and a third percent tariff In view of
the prevailing commodity prices,

(1) a three

(2) an infringement of the

sovereign right to fix

the tariff rates,
(3)

inability to make reciprocity arrangements with
the powers,

(4)

no-differentiation of rates between luxuries and
necessities,

(5) a loss of revenue
(6)

to the Chinese exchequer,

difficulty to bring about revision to an
effective five percent. 1
In asking for tariff autonomy, China professed no

desire to interfere with the present administration of the
Maritime Customs nor to interfere with foreign loans secured
2
to then.

Referring to the treaties of 1902 and 1903 as

precedent to raise the Chinese import tariff to twelve and a

half percent, Mr. Root reminded Mr. Koo that those treaties
intended the increase as compensation for the abolition of
likin.

1.

Mr. Koo agreed on this point and emphasized the fact

"Conference on the Limitation of Armament," Senate Documents,
vol. X, 67th Cong., 2d Sess ( .ashington, 1922), p. 444.

2. Ibid., p. 471
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that China was anxious for the abolition of likin as it

impeded domestic trade as well as foreign.

Senator Underwood, of the American delegation,
read tho report of the subcommittee on tariff.

In the

main, the report stated that there were two phases of
tariff re~adjustaent.

One of these might become i mediately

applicable without treaty form, related to revision on the
1

basis of an effective five percent tariff.
re vision would

A committee of

meet at Shanghai for this purpose.

The

additional revenue it expected to raise for China was set
at approximately £17,000,000 silver.

The second phase of

adjustments, which must be in treaty form, required

ratification of subjects to be dealt with in a special
conference.

To apply this phase, seeps would be taken for

tho convening of a special conference to abolish likin and

bring the sur taxes of the treaties of 1902 and 1903 into
effect.

otb of these measures concerning China* s tariff

were incorporated in a treaty signed by the nine member

Powers relating to revision of the Chinese Customs Iteriff.

An annex or protocol to the Treaty was advanced,
embodying the statement by the Chinese delegation of their
the
intent on not to change the present administration of

Senate documents
1. Conference on the Limitation of Armament,"
59U.
vol. X, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington, 1922), p.

44.

Chinese Efaritlce Customs.

?.!r.

Koo objected to making

domestic policy of the Chinese Oovcrnment en in te mat! oriel
1

treaty obligation.

Senator Underwood, backing Mr. Koo,

spoke for a large number of Americans who, he said, would

protest a treaty coercing China into an agreement that was

unsatisfactory to her,

Mr. Koo added that the Chinese

declaration did not mean that China had foresworn her
"legitimate aspiration to make the Chinese .Maritime Customs
2

service an institution more national in China."

It was

unanimously agreed that the Chinese voluntary declara tlon

of policy would not be publicly announced in the treaty.
_hls concession was a diplomatic victory for the Chinese.

However, the request for tariff autonomy was not

granted in 1922.

The Powers admitted the need for

modification of China's customs tariff and provided for it,
but the "existing limitation on her sovereignty" was not

bollard in his study of the period give special

removed,

commendation to the capable Peking diplomats who represented
China at this time.

Itieir

accomplishments were significant

in the development of treaty revision, thou^i they failed
3

because of lack of support at Peking*

The militarists who

Documents, ,
1. "Conference on the Limitation of Axaament," i>enate
(Washington, 1922 , p. 770.
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, 67 th Con
f 2d Seas.
}

:
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"
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m
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controlled Peking denied the constructive work of the
diplomats and used the Peking Foreign Office as a buffer
between their Government and the Foreign Powers.
The work of the Revision Commission provided by
the Customs Treaty was completed by September 28, 1922, and
the American State Department was prepared to publish the

revised schedule before the Customs Treaty was actually
ratified.

To do so it *as necessary to obtain the separate

approval of each government concerned.

The Japanese delayed

concerted action by suggesting a two weeks advance notice of
the revised schedule before It should be put into effect.*
The Powers accepted this olan and thereby delayed the

application of the Import tariff until January 17, 1923.
Once the technical aspect of the tariff problem

had been settled, the political phase emerged as a focus of
international Interest.

The United States was anxious to

have the tariff ouestlon discussed as an entity.

Hughes

instructed the American Banking Group to formulate a plan
for dealing with China's unsecured debts and thus relieve
the coming Special Conference from the burden of discussing

Chinese finance.

For the State Department felt that

1.
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unsettled finances could

prevent a constructive use of

the proposed customs surtax that was to be implemented at

the 3peclal Conference.

Hughes feared that a political

reaction would then take place when the Chinese
misuse of the surtax expenditure.

saif

the

Also, a point to be

considered, some of China *s unsecured debts (notably the

Japanese Nislhara loans) were connected with controversial
political questions.

A

heir political character would cause

agitation at the Special Conference and confuse the main
issue.

Hughes* analysis proved later to be accurate, but

no action was taken on the matter at this time.
In 1923 the Powers had to determine an Immediate

policy with regard to the distribution of customs surplus
funds to the two Chinese Governments which were claiming
them.

0 u r interests in the Customs lay in the pledge

of the Chinese Maritime Customs revenues as security for the

payment of the Boxer indemnity.

T his connection brought the

Customs under treaty rights in the event that maintenance

was endangered.
The Canton authorities threatened to seize the

Maritime C us toras to secure their share of the surplus.
Secretary of Foreign Affairs for the Canton Government

1.
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p.

536.

The
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presented the diplomatic body with

••the

claim of the

Southwestern provinces for their share of the customs
surplus."

1

His note lodged a complaint aralnst distribution

of the surplus which remained after the payment of foreign

debts.

He declared that the surplus paid past debts of the

Peking Government and thus set free other revenues which
were then used by Northern militarists to make war against
Canton promised that it would use its share of

the South.

the funds for constructive purposes: municipal improvements;

provincial roads; currency reform; river conservancy;
agriculture and sericulture; education and the suppression
The note denied the validity of the Peking

of piracy.

Government and condemned the policy of the United states for

recognizing it as the Government of China.
The issue at hand for the United States was danger
of disintegration of the customs service.

Because of the

basis in treaty right, Coolldge gave his approval of the
use of naval units to prevent the proposed seizure.

The

State Department, further, believed that the whole system
of treaty rights for the maintenance of foreign trade would

be endangered by the contemplated move of the Canton

Government.

1.

The American Minister advocated a course of

Foreign Relations

,

1923,

I,

p.

552.
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waiting out the threat of the Canton regime, hoping to
force the Chinese people to unite against internal forces
of disruption.

1

This course reiterated the appeal made by

^inese before China had

the American Government to the

declared war against the Central Powers.

The United States

had consistently desired political unity in China.

The

Department was adamant in its original stand in the matter of
dealing with the customs surpluses only as trustees for the

recognized government of China.
With its policy outlined, the United States joined
the Powers in a naval demonstration to prevent the proposed

seizure by Canton.

The situation was awkward because of the

complications Involved.

If the Powers took the Maritime

Customs house, Sun Yat-Sen
afrd

'

s

group might make a counter move

declare Canton a free port,

^hat would force the Powers

to declare a blockade or give up the contest.

The diplomatic body at Peking informed the

Government at Canton that the granting or refusal of their
claim did not lie within the province of the power of the

diplomatic body.

The policy was determined by Treaty rights

derive from that protocol

in 1901 \*hereby the Powers,

interest
the right to ensure the priority of the payment of

l
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and amortization of certain foreign loans secured on the

customs revenues previous to 1901 and of payment of

interest and amortization of the indemnity.

...

1,1

Further-

more, by agreement between the diplomatic body and the

Chinese Government January 30, 1912, the diplomatic body

was given trusteeship of the Maritime Customs revenues to

protect the Boxer obligations.

Strictly defining the sphere

of their power, the diplomats, by concerted action, refused
the request of the Canton Government.

The Nationalist press reported that its Government

would probably start anti-foreign agltr.tion in answer to the
naval demonstration.

2

It charged that the Powers were

holding the large customs revenues that were needed by the
Chinese to reduce taxes and the cost of living.

The

propaganda attacked the United States and expressed Chinese
disappointment in finding the United States ready to use
force with the other Powers.

Sun Yat-Sen issued a manifesto

to the American people complaining of the naval threat to

Canton.
The Nationalists complemented publicity with action.

Sun ordered the commissioner of customs to hold all customs

1.
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revenues at the disposal of the Canton Government, minus
the surplus paid to foreign obligations.

to uphold

2 his willingness

foreign obligations showed a sincere desire on the

part of the Cantonese Government to win recognition from the

powers as the lawful government of China.

A few days after the Canton manifesto was issued,
half of the British force withdrew from Canton.

The American

Minister noted this move as a possibility that Britain was
weakening, and urged that she be persuaded to maintain

collective solidarity on the most important matter that had
come up since the Washington Conference.

The British replied

that they no longer considered the naval demonstration

necessary, but desired arrangements for its renewal if the

need should ever arise.

1

The United States re-avowed its

intent to co-operate in the event of a similar emergency,
also, but it denied that the demonstration was no longer

necessary.

However, shortly after this reply, the American

force was withdrawn in accordance with Hughes' Instructions
that the naval unit could depart if Sun Yat-3en*s group did
not carry out their threat to seize the Customs or attack
the Customs house, and they did not.

1.
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of seizure flared again that year,

the British Foreign Office

learned that Sun Yat-sen was threatening to seize only the
"native* Canton customs, and for this action there would be
no need for a naval demonstration by the Powers.

The Powers

succeeded in preventing the proposed seizure, but the

results were unsatisfactory for the prestige of foreigners
in China.

The naval demonstration caused Canton to look to

Ilussla for aid against foreign encroachment.

The Peking Government gained an Immediate advantage

over the United States in the matter of collecting certain

Internal taxes and succeeded in complicating the tariff
situation which the Powers were planning to determine at
The Standard Oil Company of

the coming Tariff Conference.

New York asked the State Department for support to secure an

efficient system of taxation in China.

1

The complaint

was made that certain provinces, deprived of likin on foreign
imports, had placed a local tax almost equal to the amount

paid for Customs transit passes and had given passes for
further exemption in exchange.

"

Such a system defrauded the

Central Government and undermined treaty provisions.

The

Department expressed sympathy for the Company but acknowledged

1.
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an inability to take action re llkin because the Treaty of

February 6, 1922 relating to Chinee Cur torn 8 Tnriff hm& not
been ratified by all Powers.

This was a local victory whereby

the provinces profited at the expense of the Peking Government.

3uch lack of foresight would not help convince the foreign

Powers of China*

s

ability to determine her own tariff, much

as It might hasten the special conference.

The Chinese Government proposed a preliminary

conference to decide a tentative agenda for later proceedings.
The necessity for putting the surtax into operation was

apparent to the Chinese in view of the drastic financial

condition and the inability to pay foreign and domestic
obligations.

However, In view of chaos in China, the

representatives of the signatory Powers advised examination
of

tlie

surtax.

financial status of China and the proposed use of the
2

They felt, moreover, that the Peking Government

should present its plan for the abolition of likln.

These

stipulations were advised before a reply to the Chinese

request was made.

The American Minister feared that if

the preliminary conference should fail, the weight of the
3 m.
The
decreased.
Special Conference would be considerably

I.
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Department concurred with the Minister because of the

disregard of trr.aty rights by the provincial official

the

discriminatory railroad rates, and other Instances of
endang- ring American nationals and property.

1

The safest

course, then, would be that based on definite treaty

stipulations.

The request for a preliminary conference was

accordingly refused.
The Peking Government, on June 24, 1925, sent an

Identic note to the Powers, requesting a readjustment of
trr:,:ty

relations.

Representatives of the Peking Foreign

Office assured the American Charge that the purpose of the

note was to proceed with the national aspirations cf the

Chinese and to neutralize radical propaganda which aimed at
the cancellation of "unequal treaties."

2

Whatever its

purposes, the note brought action from the Povrers.

Representatives of the signatory Pox^ers of the Washington
Conference in China suggested to their governments that the
Special Tariff Conference and the Extraterritoriality

Commission be convened as soon as China could re-estab'ish
order.

Thus China took the initiative in forcing the Po -era
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to carry out the promises of the Washington Treaty.

The

unknown factor was the extensive meaning behind the

reestablishment of order in China.
Kellogg instructed the American Delegates to the
Tariff Conference J.

V.

A.

MacHurray and Silas Strawn that,

"the Special Conference ought to go beyond the strict scope

of its activities as defined In the Customs Treaty and enter

into a discussion of the entire subject of the conventional
tariff,

even including proposals looking toward ultimate

tariff autonomy.

Kellogg felt that the levying of a surtax

was mandatory and should not be limited by the condition that
China abolish likln.

He deviated from Hughes' suggestion

that the question of Chinese finance best be excluded from
the conference.

For the political situation that prevailed

made it advisable that the Conference should consider using

surtax revenues to refund China's unsecured obligations.
In the instructions, his last concern was for the

co-operative policy which he hoped could be maintained, but
not at the risk of our taking sides for or against any other
3

government represented at the Conference.
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1

s
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policy can be Interpreted as sympathetic to the Chinese.
He gave evidence here, of wanting to co-operate with the
Po -ers only on condition that we would not have to enter
an agreement detrimental to Chinese Nationalist aims and

ambiti ons.
In drafting a reply to the Chinese note, Kellogg

•ished to extend the scope of the Special Tariff Conference
to revise the customs treaties "looking toward ultimate

tariff autonomy.

The American Minister, MacMurray,

suggested the unadvlsability of using the phrase "tariff
autonomy.

M

2

To him the entire temper of Chinese national

expression had changed to one desiring repudiation of
For this osychological factor of

foreign obligations.

China's feeling of inferiority should not be overlooked by

foreign Powers who had treaty rights in China.
he thought,

The process,

should be gradual relinquishment, and for this

reason the United States should stay with the Powers in

determining revision policy.

Kellogg was firm in his

expression that we were ready to consider the entire matter
of treaty revision with the other Powers or alone.
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he let Kacilurray decide whether or not to include
the phra
in the event of our sending a note to China concerning

American policy.

MaoMurray thus had freedom to act on the matter.
His action was a statement of his opinion regarding the

customs tariff.
....My Government sympathizes with the feeling
of the Chinese Government that the tariff
schedules attached to the various treaties between
China and other Powers have become a severe
handicap upon the ability of China to adjust its
import tariffs to meet the domestic economic needs
of the country
and is furthermore willing
,
either at that Conference or at a subsequent time
to consider and discuss any reasonable proposal
that may be made by the Chinese Government for a
revision of the Treaties on the subject of the
1
tariff

Thus MaoMurray prevented his Government from stating that it

was ready to take individual action on the question of the

tariff and from recognizing China's right to tariff autonomy.
The co-operative policy was maintained, and the civil strife

in China was allowed to run its course without interference

from foreign Powers.

As time for the Conference to meet drew near,
Kellogg felt unprepared to aay whether or not it would be
wise for us to declare for unconditional surrender of tariffs

1.
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and extraterritoriality.

The possibility arose that we might

be driven to such independent release if the other Powers

refused to make reasonable concessions. 1

The Secretary of

State was apparently keenly responsive to public opinion.

A conference was held in Baltimore September 26, 1925 to
discuss American Relations with China.

A resolution was

adopted to bring about independent action on the part of
the United States concerning treaty revision.

The Chinese Minister presented a provisional

agenda to the Powers.

Tariff autonomy and an interim surtax

were the main topics for discussion, according to the Chinese
desires.

From its secondary position on the agenda, the

abolition of llkin was considered relatively unimportant.
The representatives of the Conference Powers sent an identic

telegram to their governments, recommending the modification
of the Chinese proposals to emphasize the abolition of llkin

as a major consideration.

The purpose of the modification

was to make tariff autonomy a mere wish on the part of the
Chinese Government and thus to separate llkin from tariff
autonomy.

3
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Kellogg, while preferring action without an

agenda of any sort, nevertheless felt that it should be

accepted to show the Powers 1 desire to co-operate rather
than to dictate to the Chinese. 1

Here again, the Secretary

was voicing his belief that China was entitled to such

consideration among the Powers.

Accordingly, he proposed

a new tariff as a solution of the problem, which would

embody a general tariff of raost-f wored-nation treatment
for an Interim period preparatory to the oomolete restoration
of tariff autonomy.

Again HaoMurray advised the 3ecretary of mate
that China did not expect tariff autonomy.

2

The core of the

problem, rather, was the possibility of getting the Pour re
five
of
to agree to an interim surtax
/ percent instead of the
two and a half percent as provided in the treaty.

It would

be used as basis for a loan, the greater part of which would

be given to funding the unsecured foreign and domestic debts

and the balance would be used for administrative function*.
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At the opening session of the Special Conference,
the Chinese delegates laid strong emphasis on the importance
of tariff autonomy for China 1 a economic equality in the

world.

1

The Chinese Government proposed tariff autonomy

and abolition of likln as simultaneous measures to come Into
effect January 1, 1929.

2

In this proposal, provision was

made for an Interim surtax on luxuries.

Answering replies characterized the Powers
convictions regarding the tariff.

The American Minister

spoke for proceedings that would help the Chinese national

aspirations to become realized.

He did not mention

tariff autonomy, per se> although the national expression
for it was well publicized.

The French emphasized the

necessity for financial rehabilitation of China.

4

The

British evidenced a desire to remain within the scope
outlined at Washington in 1922.

g
'-The

Japanese gave outright

support to the consideration of tariff autonomy.
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sweeping statement of the Japanese Minister was qualified
by his admitting that tariff autonomy was a goal to be

reached only by successive

stages."*"

At a tariff autonomy committee meeting, China

asked the Powers to concede the principle of autonomy with
the abolition of likin.

The United States reserved decision

until further study of the plan to abolish likin and other
taxes had been made.

Dr. Wang answered for China by saying

that the delay in abolishing likin was caused by the fact

that likin was the main source of revenue for many of the

provinces.

2

He suggested an investigation of the problems

in the provinces to facilitate abolition.

Compensation for

likin would be necessary and could be paid by the Central
Government from a portion of the increased customs revenue
of the surtax.

Kellogg approved of the suggestion of the American

delegation that, "The Chinese Government is so lacking in
stability that there is great danger that this or a succeeding government may renounce the treaties unless we concede
some of the demands.

tt

For this reason it was decided to

accept the Chinese proposal for the abolition of likin.
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However, an Impasse was reached on the question of

tariff autonomy.

The Chinese delegation wanted the Conference

to "declare recognition of China's right to enjoy tariff

autonomy" upon the abolition of likln. 1
China to accept their

M

The Powers wanted

intention to recommend to their

respective Governments the Immediate adoption of a treaty
which shall recognize China's right to enjoy tariff autonomy."
The subcommittee on tariff autonomy recommended a resolution

that was unanimously adopted by the Conference recognizing

China's right to enjoy tariff autonomy and acknowledging

her promise to abolish llkln.
This resolution was exactly what China wanted.

The

next step would be to have it accepted by the Governments of
the delegates.

The Chinese got the impression from the

ensuing diplomacy that the Powers admitted China's right to

tariff autonomy but withheld legal recognition.

The

Conference, it would seem, adopted the resolution as an

expedient measure In the face of adverse propaganda urging
the establishment of tariff autonomy, preferably through
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diplomacy, but, if necessary, by abrogating all customs
treaties.

The Powers, however, held

a.

superior position.

The political and financial state of China was chaotic,
-hen the Special Conference went into session early in 1926,
the Powers were seriously concerned with the insecure position

of the Central Government

.

Th^t Government was asking for

the two and one half percent surtax to become effective

immediately and for unrestricted use of the revenue.^"

The

American delegation opposed the political connotation of
foreign support that might be granted to this Government.
For Militarists were in control of Peking and they would

probably use the increased revenue to wage war against the
South.

The South 1 s objection to Peking control of the

surtax was the same as its argument against the distribution
of the customs surplus in 1923.

Both Governments however

were in drastic need of financial assistance.
The Americans proposed to carry on negotiations

irrespective of disturbed conditions.

Ty>e

Chinese requested

continuation of the conference, and the United StateB was
willing to comply to please China and to live up to our

1.
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declared policy at Washington.
To abide by the terras of the Washington Conference,
the American delegation wanted the Powers to co-operate on a

general tariff policy.

Therefore, if China should dis-

integrate before the

aty was ratified, it would not be the

tr<

fault of the Powers.

Kellogg informed the British Government

of our desire to continue negotiations, and expressed hope

that the British would co-operate with the Conference to

keep it in session. 1
The American, British, and Japanese advisers drew

up a draft protocol agreeing:
(1)

to levy surtaxes,

(2)

to collect them in Maritime Customs Administration
and apply them to
(a) abolition of likin,
(b) abolition of "coast traue duty",
(o) administrative need of gov. rnuient
(d) liquidation of unsecured debts,
(e) deposit in specified banks.

2

The governments of the representatives with the exception of

Japan approved the protocol.
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maintained the desire of Its government not to "implement
'

the Washington surtaxes apart from the negotiation of the

larger treaty which the Conference had under consideration,

H

which included funding the unsecured debts. 1 They claimed
willingness for a summer recess and readjournraent
September 30.

MacMurray objected to the recess on the grounds

that it violated the pledge given by the Powers to China,

2

but It went through.

While the Conference was adjourned, the Nationalist

Government at Canton protested against resuming the Conference,
on the grounds that it supported the militarists.

The American

Minister replied to Chen, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs
at Canton, that lack of unanimity in China denied the attempt
2
The
readjustment.
treaty
effect
to
give
of the Po-.rers to

communication was sent in the hope that It might serve a
useful purpose if Chen did not accept it as material for

propaganda.

Chen immediately outlined the Nationalist

opinions to MacMurray:
The policy (of the United States) is wrong
because it is an expression of American failure to
realize that the Chinese situation is fundamentally
i.e. a fundamental
a Revolutionary situation

,
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solution is necessary as opposed to a solution
Involving a aeries of so called Revolutionary
re-adjustments. And the situation is Revolutionary
because the principle of change implicit in the
Revolution of 1911-12 has not yet been vorked out
in the life of the Nation, particularly in its
politico-economic aspect, owing to the constant
interference and Intervention, direct and indirect,
of certain Foreign Powers who (to cite some single
Instances) first supported Yuan Shih-kal in his
attempt to destroy the Chinese Republic and
financed him with the Re-orranization loan of 1913,
next supported Tuan Chi- Jul in his Anfu days (proJapanese) and financed him with the Nishiara and
other loans, then supported Wu Pei-fu and financed
him with Customs and Salt surpluses, and are now
contemplating the support of a composite strong
man in the diversified persons of Wu Pel-fu and
Chang Tso-lin ond the financing of this brace of
militarists with the proceeas of a loan to be
secured on the promised Tariff surtaxes.
Nationalist China insists on a fundamental
solution of the group of Issues known as the Chinese
Internally, this means that the new
question.
military and political technique which has enabled
the Nationalist £ov eminent to unify the Liang-Kuang
militarily, fiscally and politically must be applied
on a national scale in order that the Chinese people
may work out their own salvation in the interests of
themselves as a whole and not to subordinate the
same to such alien interests as foreign high finance
and foreign trade. And externally, the dominating
feature of a fundamental solution of the Chinese
question is that America should revise its present
policy of "bringing into effect certain re-adjustments' of its treaty relations with China" and,
recognizing the neces ity of a General Re-adjustment
of such treaty relations, instead of re-adjustments
on the Instalment plan, satisfy the demand of
Nationalist China for the substitution of the
uneaual treaties by other treaties consistent with
the real independence and sovereignty of China.
This is a policy that has been definitely brought
within the range of practical politics and proved
to be both practicable and expedient by the bold
statesmanship of Soviet Russia.

66.

As there is not such a government at the
moment, I have the honour to repeat the warning
that the Nationalist Government whose authority
is now extending to Central China, will repudiate
all and every loan to be concluded with agents of
Wu Pel-fu and Ohang Tso-lln in Peking, and to add
that the resumption of the Special Conference
x/ill be viewed by my Government as a deliberate
attempt on the part of the United States an, other
Inter*- sted Powers to convert the Chinese Maritime
Customs from a politico- fiscal organ into an
engine of war- finance and foreign intervention in
China 1 s civil or other
Revolutionary war.
In
this event the Nationalist Government will be
compelled to take certain defensive measures.*
The Peking Government was trying to force the

Powers to reconvene the Conference by threatening to assume
tariff autonomy.

>*ith

both North and 3outh threatening the

PowersjHACilurray had acted independently and began negotiations

with the Canton regime.

He then explained his purpose to

Kellogg who sanctioned it.
regret that, under the necessity of taking
Immediate action to avert our being placed in false
light of partisanship toward the military coalition
now occupying capital, I was compelled to take a
position in this delicate matter without the
opportunity of obtaining your instructions; and my
having done so may indeed result in diminishing
chances that this Cabinet might obtain recognition
either of our own or of other governments; and it
must be realized that there is at present tine no
reasonable prospect nor any expectation among
representative China of the formation in the
immediately forseeable future of a government
2
country
the
of
support
general
commanding the
I
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The Amirioan State Department had no de-ire to

break with the Powers on the question of continuing the
Conference.

The best course to pursue in accordance irith

the Washington Treaty would be action by the Powers to

enforce surtaxes on their own nationals independent of China. 1
The 3ritish Indicated willingness to follow along these lines

without consideration of likin or debt consolidation.
C.

P.

p

Howl and in his study of the diplomacy of this

period found a general parallel between the British and
American policies on the matter of co-operating for the
benefit of China.

However, he found that the United States

was always Just a little behind Great Britain in its liberality
toward Chinese national aspiration.

He described the British

attitude as a natural aspect of their position in China which
was the initiator of the treaty system, leading trader hurt
by Chinese boycotts, and Power most closely associated with
the Shanghai massacre.

4
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During the fall the Powers agreed that there

were no

dele??;

tes qualified to represent China at the

Conference and consequently the Special Conference was no
longer to be regarded as in session.

R.

T.

Pollard

concluded that the Conference failed partly because the
Peking Government was ineffective as a central organ for
exchange between China and the Powers and partly because
of disagreement among the Powers over disposition of the
1

surtax.

When the Conference failed, the Powers had to meet
the situation of China's imposing taxes that were contrary

to treaty provisions.

The Canton Government informed the

Powers that it intended to levy consumption and production
taxes on all merchandise passing through the Maritime Customs
of the port.

The proceeds of the revenue were to be used to

pay strikers in the anti-British boycott.

The Department

saw no need for discussing the matter of imposition with the

British or Japanese or for planning for a naval demonstration.
The first step was to inform the authorities at Canton of

following
our concern for the violation of existing treaties,

procedure of past protests.

1.

R.

T.

Pollard, China's Foreign Relations , p. 280,

G9.

The diplomatic body locked upon the imposition
of the Canton taxes as the beginning of the end of treaty-

rights in China.

It drew up a draft protest to which the

United States gave adherence.

This policy of local protest

was applied by the American Consuls at Tsingtan and Tsinan
against a "goods tax of 2 percent ad valorem imported into

Shantung Province.

"

Chen informed the Consul at Canton that

his Government wished to follow closely the Tariff Conference
schedules of new taxes.

He asked for a list of luxuries

and for the minutes of the Conference meetings, but the

Minister

denied his request, awaiting determination of

Department policy.
C

The United States would not conciliate

nton on minor matt rs befo.

tariff treaty had been

e a

concluded.
In October the British Minister in conversation

with American Charge Mayer let it be known that his Government

would acquiesce to the new taxation if it
the Maritime Customs Administration.
hovrever,

2

ivere

placed under

The British desired,

an exchange of views with the American and Japanese

Departments before taking action.
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p. 661.

70.

Department held to its original stand that taxes violating
treaty rights should be protested,

'^ho

collecting agent

I.e. Chinese Customs or opposing factions of the Nationalist

Government was to have no Influence on our attitude.
The American Minister warned his Government of the

importance of time In determining our policy.

He received

aut orlzation on December 13 to negotiate with Britain and
Japan,

H

to doolare that the Washington surtaxes would be

applicable to their nationals on condition that the Maritime
Customs collect the taxes and the revenues go to the
1

authorities In control.

The United States had a dual policy,

co-operating with the Powers and having Intercourse with the
Nationalist regime.

Kellogg supported the co-operative

policy concerning application of the surtax In spite of his

doubting the wisdom of It.

America stayed with the Powers

in formulating a tariff policy to the limit of Its oonvlotlon,

although its sympathies were with the moderate nationalists
by the end of 1926.
The British Charge announced to the Chiefs of

Missions in China on December 18 that the British Government

wanted the Powers to grant the Washington surtaxes immediately

1.

Foreign Relations

,

.

1926,

I,

p.

912.
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and recognize China's "right to enjoy tariff autonomy as
soon as she herself has settled and promulgated a new national

tariff, .... and while calling upon China to maintain that

respect for the sanctity of treaties which is the primary

obligation common to all civilized states, .... recognize
both the essential justice of China's claim for treaty

revision and the difficulty in present conditions of

negotiating new treaties in the place of old, .... modify
their traditional attitude of a rigid insistence on the
„1

strict letter of treaty rights."

The public concluded from this statement that

Great Brit.iin was talcing a more liberal lead toward China

MaoMurray criticized the British

than the other Powers.

attitude as conciliatory.

p

It merely invited complete

repudiation of all obligations.

However, these radical

concessions by Gr^at Britain, leading trader in China, would

perforce comiiit the United States to an equally liberal
policy to maintain co-operation among Powers.
Accordingly, the State Department
to the British statement.

1.
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,

fcave full

support

Kellogg desired a reciprocal

1926,

I,

p.

918.

most-f avored-nation treatment with China as soon as treaty
controls were relinquished,

^he Secretary of State announced

his intention of being willing to negotiate revision with
China to abolish extraterritoriality and tariff control in
the near future.

The British promise had acted as stimulus

for American action, individual action.

Early in January,

1927, Kellogg clarified his policy by professing hope that
the United States would be a moral influence for a united
China.

And he asserted that if unity could come about, we

would then be willing to make concessions to China on the

Washington Conf renoe Treaties.

1

This statement left the

£

decision of introducing negotiations up to both of the
Chinese Gov eminent s.
Dr. Koo,

of the new Peking Cabinet, presented

three demands to the Powers: tariff law autonomy to be

effective January 1, 1929; application of Washington surtaxes
to be levied February 1, through the Maritime Customs and

resumption of the Special Conference; and new revenues
applied to a sinking fund for abolition of likln and for the
funding of the unsecured debt for administrative purposes.

2

American policy of moral leadership was difficult
to maintain,

for both the North and South had broken away

1,
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from "old treaties" as well as from the Washington Confcrenoe

Treaty.

Kwangtung established a provincial tax in addition

to import duties, surtaxes and likin; Kukden declared the

system of exemption certificates inapplicable, for the whole
of liancjiuria and Shantung had its "good tax.*

Protests

seemed futile, but the Department instructed the Consulates
to be alert for discriminatory treatment of American citizens
1

by de facto officials.

The Nationalist Government imposed a stamp tax

which the American Government upheld because it was not

discriminatory, for it wa3 levied against Chinese as well as
foreigners.

Nor did the Department support the complaint

by wine and tobacco merchants against the tax imposed on
these articles.

The Government refused to observe that

arrangements made between the Chinese administration and

private American companies were a basis for protest against
national tax policies.

The State Department was Judiciously

and Impartially trying to extend the promises made to China
in 1922.

I n regard to a luxury tax,

In some ports, the

Department acquiesced tacitly in the belief that it was a

collection equivalent of the Washington surtaxes.
The Nationalist Government announced three laws to

1.
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II,

p.

383.
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become effective on September 1st.
(a) the law on abolition of internal transit dues,
(b) provisional law on national import tariff,
(c) Law on excise duty.^"

As with the Peking arbitratory action, the American Govern-

ment withheld reply to the demands, considering them a

contravention of treaty rights.

Apparently both Peking and

Canton were using the eame arbitrary methods to see if the

Powers would accede. The United States refused. Her offer
treaty
The
of moral leadership did not countenance/ abrogation.

Hanking Government decided,

w

ln view of existing circumstances,

to temporarily postpone the enforcement of

proposed laws

1

."

2

*the three

Boi 1 Peking and Nankin;- stopped short of

drastic measures that would sever diplomatic connections
completely.

A resolution was introduced to the House of
Representatives on January 4, 1927, requesting that the

President undertake negotiations with China to render the
3

treaty relations between the nations equal and reciprocal.
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In the main, the resolution paralled the policy that the

State Department had been ardously following.

Representatives from the Nationalist Government
called at Washington to discuss the possibility of

negotiating in regard to treaty revision on the basis of

Kellogg 1 s statement of January 27.

2

The Nationalist rep-

resentatives expressed a strong desire on the part of their
government to have the support of the United States in
of the impending break with Soviet Russia.

T

iex*

The Poking

and Hanking factions were willing to appoint a Joint

Commission to discuss treaty revision with the United States.

Kellogg expressed willingness to act with them in the hope
that our participating would lead to a union between the

North and South and thus end the Olvil

liar.

Such action

was similar to our hopes that Washington Conference policies

would help China unite.

Actually unification was taking

1
place through force and this proposal of Kellogg s was

superfluous.

Here again, he was combining the two problems

of tariff autonomy and extraterritoriality.

HaoMurray
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demurred for such a course was contrary to the policy he had
begun, which contemplated negotiations with the several

regimes in China, solely on the question of tariff
restrictions.

Tariff autonomy was to be the immediate

compensation for the establishment of a representative
government.
The Nationalist forces took Peking in June 1928

and united China under the government at Nanking.* The 'nited
States was the first foreign nation to give de jure recognition
to the Nanking Government.

carried out.

MacMurray's policy was immediately

A treaty regulating tariff regulations between

the United States and China was signed at Peiping July 25.

The use of the name Peiping was the first treaty recognition
of the Nationalist name for Peking.
The question of tariff autonomy lay primarily in
the political sphere of the tariff problem,

She heritage of

treaty stipulation and international co-operation had been
too firmly Implanted as Far Eastern Policy for the United

States to give adherence to the Chinese demand for autonomy
in 1922.

The proposed 3pecial Conference decided upon at

Washington was merely a component part of declared policy in

1.

Dennis, "The Treaty Regulating Tariff Relations
Journal of
een the United States and China." American
International Law, XXII (October 1928), 834.
C.

?7.

1903 to implement surtaxes granted as compensation for the

abolition of likin.
The turning point of the American policy was

brought by the matter of applying these surtaxes.

In

November 1926 the United States was willing to comply

v.ith

the other Powers to have the surtaxes imposed and collected

by the Maritime Customs Administration.

That Deoember, the

British published the note that suggested appeasement to
Peking and individual action,

^hls action gave the United

States the freedom to uepart on it 6 own policy declared by

Kellogg early in 1927.

This was definite departure from

co-operation with the Powers, and it was followed by a
period of awaiting developments between the Chinese Governments.
As the Canton Minister, Chen, had said to Maciiurray,
our policy has been evolutionary in the face of a revolutionary

situation.

1

In 1925 the Canton Government had threatened to

seize the Customs to derive its share of the surplus.

It is

interesting to note that the Powers answered this threat
with a naval demonstration that proved effective.

By 1926

the co-operative policy had been weakened to the extent that

both Chinese Governments imposed taxes contravenous to treaty

1.

/ide

note 1, p. 22

rights, and the Powers were forced to accede because they

would not unite for forceful prevention.
Every year that the Tariff Conference Mai delayed,
the Powers lost strength as a co-operative force against

national expression In China.

Such weakness caused Peking

to ask for a Preliminary Conference in 1924 to apply the sur-

tax and thus relieve the financial situation.
s

•

refused, but the refusal was

nt>t

2 his request

powerful enough to

defeat the main purpose of the Chinese.

For when China

suggested treaty revision in her note of June 1925, the

Powers felt the need for hastening the Tariff Conference and
the

Extraterritoriality Commission.
The United States realized that the scope of the

Customs Treaty of 1922 was inadeouate in 1925.

Kellogg gave

evidence of our willingness to grant tariff autonomy as
soon as possible.

The Secretary of State and the American

public were anxious to recognize Nationalist China and

conclude a most- favored-nation treaty of equality and

reciprocity with her.
After Kellogg^ statement of moral leadership to a
stable representative government of China, the United States

had to pursue a Judicious policy.

The refusal of the

United States to acknowledge Chang Tso-lln»s (Peking) tariff
demand o in 1927 can be interpreted as an indication of our

79.

pro-Nationalist sentiment.

However, the United States

brought equal pressure of disapproval against similar
tactics by the Canton Government that same year.

MaoMurray was responsible for preventing Kellogg
from trying to bring about rapproachement between the North

and 3outh over general treaty revision.

This action was the

first immediate step toward diplomatic victory for the

moderate Nationalists.

The United States had one highly

desired bargaining measure, the grant of tariff autonomy.
Skillful diplomacy used it to the best advantage.

3C.

CHAPTER

III.

EXTRATERRITORIALITY

At the Sixth Meeting of the Committee on Pacific

and Far Eastern Questions at the Washington Conference,
Dr.

Wang of the Chinese delegation presented his country's

views on extraterritoriality. 1

There were now fifty ports

In which foreign nationals possessed the right of extra-

territoriality, where the original number had been five. 2
This meant a great Increase in the number of people residing
in China over whom China had no control.
an,

The matter was

"impairment of the territorial and administrative

integrity of China,

w

and an immediate solution was

imperative.

In addition to the national humiliation that

she suffered,

China had to acknowledge a multiple system of

courts and the attendant confusion arising thereby.

Consular courts were often too far from the seene wherein
the case originated to make disposal of Justice effective.

Foreigners frequently claimed immunity from local taxes
under extraterritorial exemption.

These were some of the

1.

"Conference on the Limitation of Armament," Senate
Document , vol. X, 67th Cong., 2d. Sess. (Washington,
1922), p. 475.

2.

Loo,

cit .

3.
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81.

chief objections China had against the extraterritorial
system.. China did not desire complete abolition but
a3ked
the powers to co-operate in taking measures toward

eventual abolition based on the promise made by Great
Britain, the United States, and Japan in 1902 and 19G3. 1

Accordingly draft resolutions were presented
to the Conference concerning the problem of extra-

territoriality and providing for a commission of the

Tine

Powers represented to investigate the practise of extrater ltoriality and Chinese Jurisdiction within three
o
months after adjournment.
Two months after the Washington Conference the

Chinese Government asked for a postponement of the proposed
meeting.

They wanted time to assemble necessary technical

Information to facilitate commission proceedings when it
did meet.

The United States heartily supported this

request and it was accordingly granted.
The United 3tate3 was willing to fulfill the

terms of the Washington Treaty at the earliest possible
moment.

Hughes t instruoted his Minister in China to discuss

the proposed commission with his colleagues.

He then

1.

"Conference on the limitation of Armament,* Sen 'to
Document , vol. X, 67th Con^. , 2d. 3ess. ( Washington f
1653), p. 477.

2.

Ibid., p. 514.
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suggested lines of general investigation of the many legal
compli cations that caused friction between treaty pow rs

and China.
1.

All foreign courts, laws and procedure existing
by virtue of treaty provision or custom.

2.

All Chinese Courts hearing mixed cases, including the
special courts such as the international Mixed Courts
at Shanghai and Amoy.

3.

Chinese law and legal procedure.

4.

China's Judiciary.

5.

The extent to which China has actually respected
treaty stipulations relative to extraterritoriality.

6.

China's present political condition in its bearing
on the legal and judicial systems, with particular
reference to the possibility of interference with
the course of Justice by civil or military
authorities.

7.

The status of non-treaty power nationals such as
Russians, G-erraans, and Austrians.

8.

The status of persons of Chinese race who acquire
foreign nationality and remain or return to
Chinese soil.

9.

Extradition and the right of asylum in the 1
Settlement, Concession, and Legation areas.
Hughes position supported the general contention

who
of other Pow- rs holding extraterritorial privileges in China

were not encouraged to relinquish them when they witnessed

1.

Foreign Relations , 1923,
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the dis satisfaction among nationals of Powers who had

withdrawn the grant.

The merchants and business men of

Austria and Germany had soon found protection from Chinese

Jurisdiction by incorporating their interest with American
or British firms.

Soviet Russia had withdrawn extra-

territoriality in China in 1919 with other cancellations
of special privileges to foster good will toward Communism
in China.

There were two or three thousand Russians in

China thereby placed in the position of non- treaty power

foreigners without extraterritorial
were not satisfactory.

rights."*"

The results

Confusion and legal misunderstandings

arose to such an extent that treaty Powers would not be

Inclined to think of relinquishing their rights.
Prom the example of these non-treaty Powers, it

would seem that the other Powers were not selfishly denying
China a sovereign right.

The danger to foreigners during

the turbulent period after the Va? was active enough to

cause their Governments to unanimously agree to maintain
the extraterritorial privileges.
The Chinese Government announced readiness to

have the Commission meet November 1, 1923.
of the

1.

The representatives

signatory Powers in Peking with the exception of the

Morse and H. P. HacNair, Far paster n International
(Cambridge, 1931), p. 672.
Relations
H.

B.

United 3tates were against convening the commission in the
light of existing conditions.

For during this year

foreigners in China were x*orried about the resumption of

war in Northern China.

In time of Civil War treaty nationals

felt the Importance of their extraterritorial protection

more than ever before.

However, it has been suggested that

the foreigners wished protection more against the hostile

attitude of the Chinese than against the Chinese laws
1

themselves.

Hughes agreed with the seriousness of the situation

but expressed the hope that an early meeting of the Com mission

would emphasize the political abuse in China and thus foroe
the Chinese to correct it as the first step in ridding

themselves of the obnoxious treaty privileges.
....from the vieivpolnt that this Government
is concerned not to chan don the Chinese claim
to immediate relief from the burden of extraterritoriality, but to pursue the course which
will best tend to bring about conditions of
order and stability and enable China to fulfill
the obligations as well as "to claim Jha pre8
rogatives of a sovereign state

Qwlgley, "Extraterritoriality in China", An rlcan
Journal of International Law, XX (January, 1926), p. 67.
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The legal life of the Peking Government had died

by September 1923 because Parliament had neglected to elect
a President as stipulated in the Permanent Constitution. 1
The American Kinister then advised Hughes to accept

postponement of the proposed commission.

The Secretary of

State agreed, for he re^aized that unanimous approval of
the Powers would be necessary for the success of the

Commission and the present conditions in China would not
encourage the Powers to give their consent.

He advanced

a proposal, however, accepted by the majority that a time

limit should be put upon the postponement, November

1,

1924.

It was impossible to gain unanimity on this point either

and Hughes then warned the American Minister in China to

inform the Chinese Foreign Office of the failure, but not
to give,

"any Intimation as to the attitude taken by the

individual Powers concerned toward the meeting of the
Commission.

"

3uch action was diplomatic insurance for the

Hughes

co-operative policy.

1

policy had been succinctly

declared but thus far without success.
Repeatedly throughout 1924 the Department of
State endeavored to persuade France to break the deadlock
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of international opposition to China by concluding a

settlement in regard to the payment in gold of the French
share of the Boxer indemnity. 1

Hughes was firmly convinced

that pressure by the Powers on the Chinese Government would
not restore satisfaction to either side.

Therefore, it

was the French obligation to settle the affair.
franc

11

The "gold

dispute was the most serious controversy after the

'Washington Conference.

America, Great Britain, and Japan

had little interest in the case because they were not
affected financially, but they maintained a "solid front"
in co-operation against China by not forcing France to
3
settle the affair.
The delay In ratifying the Washington Trerty

prevented definite action from being taken re extraterritoriality during the years 1922-1925.

The Chinese

were becoming increasingly anti-foreign, staging labor and
student demonstrations against imperialistic capitalism.

Propaganda against the Peking regime was successful because
it was not suppressed.

The weak Peking Government, however,

managed to settle the gold franc dispute with France in
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1925 and thus the Washington Treaty went into
effect.

In

the faoe of domestic turmoil and international
pressure

Peking also managed to send a note to the Powers
June 24,
1925, demanding treaty revision.
Repercussions were
immediate and indicative of a coming change in Chinese

relations with the Povers.
Concerning extraterritoriality, Kellogg wanted
to reply that the United States was willing to send

commissioners to investigate the problem with a view
toward relinquishing the privileges as soon as possible.
China looked to the United States to hasten the Powers
into agreement on the proposed commission.

Apparently the

Chinese were not as determined about extraterritoriality
as they were about tariff autonomy, for the Peking Minister

stated that his government did not expect the Sxtra-

territorial Commission to do more than make a report that

would not constitute a binding promise of release to China
from the Powers.

Tariff autonomy and extraterritoriality

were part of the more comprehensive aspect of foreign control
in China.

2

Events were taking place, however, that would

convince the Powers of the necessity for specific action

regarding the administrative problems of treaty revision.
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After the labor troubles assoolated with the
Shanghai incident, Japan made every effort to bring
co-

operation among the British, American, and Japanese to
settle the affair and other aspects concerning China.

Japan favored granting the Nationalist aims for tre- ty

revision to enable China to build a stable government.
The Japanese position In Manchuria was believed to be

vital to her existence as a nation.

In

regard to these

last two beliefs the Japanese diplomacy was contradictory.

Japan wanted a sovereign China except where Japan established
her own interests.

The American State Department inter-

preted the Japanese overture for co-operation as either a
decision to remain with the Western Powers or as fear that
the United States would assume the lead in granting

concessions to China and thereby threaten Japanese influence
in Peking.*
The British were inclined to favor holding the

Tariff Conference because they felt its scope would of

necessity be broadened to include the question of extraterritlriallty, whereas simultaneous meetings would
o

probably confuse the Chinese."'

The British, for the most

part, were in general agreement with the United States
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concerning treaty revision.

They would not, however,

define the work of the Extraterritoriality Commission as
finely as did the United States.

President Goolidge Instructed the State Department to judge the matter of an Extraterritoriality Commission
carefully, but to co-operate with the Powers as far as

possible to prevent the Chinese from seeing a division in
accord.

1

This was confirmation of Hughes' policy.

Kellogg informed Britain and Japan that he believed
that only rigid adherence to the Washington Conference

obligations woula solve the problem of "growing national
unrest in China."

2

The Department was inclined to believe

that China's internal chaos was only a partial answer to
the postponement and delay of the Extraterritoriality
'Joi

i

Its erroneous supposition was that conditions

mission.

in China in 1925 merely differed in degree from those in

1922.

For this reason, the Washington Conference

commitments would be suitable.

Kellogg felt that the

replies of the Powers should be sent to the Chinese
Government as soon as possible and should form the basis of
a statement for publication.
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MaoMurray then began to warn the Department about
the attendant danger of too close co-operation trith Japan

and Great Britain.

Hp ten-red that the empha«is Jppnn

placed upon the dlf f erentlation between Hanchuria and China
proper was a forerunner of an understanding parallel to
the Lansing-Ishii agreement or the Anglo- Japanese Alliance. 1

Our position was thereby made especially delicate because

China was awaiting our reaction to her anti-British and

anti-Japanese labor demonstrations.
The United States expressed itself in agreement

with Great Britain that the reply of the diplomatic body
at Peking,

"should embody an emphatic statement that there

can be no discussion of p rtioular reforms, much less a

review by the Powers of their treaty relations with China
until the Chinese Government have given evidence of their

ability and willingness to suppress disorders and to enforce
respect for the safety of foreign lives and property and
put an end to strikes and agitations which are harmful to

Chinese and foreign commercial interests...."

2

Although as

a matter of practical policy, the United States did not

believe that the complete restoration of order should be

required for discussing treaty relations.
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In the course of

^
ft

events, the practical policy was to become dominant.

MaoMurray analyzed conditions in China relating
to the present situation.

The movement seemed to him to

be national, motivated from within rather than from Russian

incitement.

1

His separating pure Nationalism from the

prevailing Communistic influence pointed the way to the
later American policy of supporting the moderate Nationalists.
He informed Kellogg that the Chinese radicals were opposed
to taking part in the Special Conference or the Extra-

territoriality Commission because such measures
further recognition of the
dictate to China.

rlr;ht of

-,/ere

foreign Powers to

The less radical trend of thought

represented at Peking maintained that the desire for treaty
revision was largely a political catchphrase.

The Peking

Government suggested a new conference to consider the
question of treaty revision more to gain prestige for their

regime than to urge the Po ers to make concessions to China.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs for Peking stated that there

were many Chinese reluctant to chance a loss of foreign
trade and to experience probable administrative chaos that

might result when tariff autonomy was granted and extraThe increasing strength of

territoriality was abolished.

1.
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the "Right 8 Recovery Movement" left the Minister*

statement open to question.
The Powers sent an identic reply to the Chinese

requests warily providing for the convention of the

Extraterritorial Commission.

No binding oomnitment was

made in this note because of the generality in the wording,
"what, if any,

steps...."

....The Establishment of the courts and the
enactment of laws, however, do not in
themselves meet all the requirements of the
situation.
Courts cannot function and
develop properly or consistently without the
aid of a stnble Government. .. .and the most
feasible way in which the question can be
approached and considered is to send to
China the Commission provided for in Resolution
.what, if any,
V of the Washington Conf erence,
steps may be taken with a vie;/ to the
^
relinquishment of extraterritorial rights.
.

. .

The first meeting of the Commission was scheduled

for January 12, 1926.

D e lay had "been caused by the

disturbed political conditions, cessation of railv^ay
communication, and Chinese Insistence of nominal chairmanship
of the Commission.

The Chinese Foreign Office had also

asked Kellogg to give the American delegates plenipotentiary

powers to oonclude definite agreements.

Such power "would

thereby give China a tactical advantage in making permanent

Xm

Forolj
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adjustments while general deliberation was in process.
The Secretary of State refused this request,

stating that

definitive power would not be accorded until the Commission

had reported to the Government of the United States,
The Chinese Commission submitted a plan for

consideration.

China was determined to motivate the course

of proceedings as much as she was able.

(1) Consular Jurisdiction;

(2) trial of mixed

cases between Chinese and foreigners having
extraterritorial right a J (3) trial of cases
between foreigners having extraterritorial
rights and (a) foreigners having no extraterritorial rights, (b) foreigners of countries
having treaty relations with China; (4) mixed
court 8; (5) quasi right of asylum in premises
occupied by foreigners and on foreign ships;
(6) issue of foreign nationality certificates
to Chinese citizens; (7) claim of foreigners to
exemption from taxation; and (8) special areas
(a) foreign settlements, (b) leased territory,
±
zones.
railway
(d)
Peking,
Quarter,
(c) Legation

Although some of the delegates objected to a few
of the proposals in the list, p rtalning to taxation (7) and

special areas (8), Kellogg instructed the American delegates
to put no obstacle in the way of China* s presenting views

or data for consideration.

The Commission delegates presented their Governments

1.

Foreign Relations

,

1926,

I,

pp.

970-971.

with full reports of their work on September 16, 1926.
The American Department of State published the full report
that same November.

China had wanted the first three parts

of the report kept from general publication because of

misapprehensions that might arise from the findings of the
Commission, but the Powers denied this request.

The report

was divided into four parts:

Part

I.

Part II.
Part

Hi

Part IV.

Present practise of extraterritoriality
Laws and Judicial and prison systems of China

Administration of Justice in China
Recommendations.

2

The Commission, in making a general observation
on extraterritoriality, admitted that the present conception

was unfavorable.

The system represented the conflict between

a growing Nationalistic spirit and expanding foreign interests

Thus the limitations on China* s sovereign rights were stressed

A study was made of the three Constitutions of the
Chinese Republic, examining provisions for the rights of

citizens and the guarantees of independent Judiciaries to

evaluate the laws which derived their validity from the

983.
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"Report of the Commission on Extraterritoriality in China/
5.
United States Department of State (Washington, 1926), p.

I,

p.

—

Constitutions.

China was commended in the Ret>ort for p-enpral

principles of judicial reform that had been instigated to
carry out the provisions of the 1902 and 1903 treaties.
The results were discernable in a modern system of courts

with procedural and substantive law.

However, the Commission

discovered important discrepancies in the modern legal
For a number of ancient laws and legal principles

system.

continued in force, and negligent enforcement of new laws

restricted tVeir application.

It was found that some

provisions of the law in connection with personal law, i.e.
concubinage and bonding of children, and the extensive power
of the magistrates, were still in existence.

2

There were

eighteen hundred magistrates* courts in China compared with
one hundred and fifty modern courts.

The greater part of

Chinese litigation was carried on in these ancient courts.
Few of the presiding officials in magistrates' courts were

legally trained.

The right of legal counsel was often

denied and detention in civil cases was frequently allowed
—

1.

-

,

— ———

—

"Report of the Commission on Extraterritoriality in China/
United States Department of 3tate (Washington, 19^8), p. 30.
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in these courts.

Military and naval oourts had

.juris-

diction over all cases in which servicemen and civilian

plaintiff 3

-/ere

Involved.

In time of emergency they had

Jurisdiction over all cases, held trial in camera, denied
le

counsel, and permitted corporal punishment

six-hundred blows of the bamboo.^"

to

i

The wide scope of

martial Jurisdiction, in view of the prevailing civil
strife,

offered convincing evidence for the general

feeling among foreigners that they needed the security of
extraterritoriality.

The Commission listed a number of

cases to show that the military authorities were arbitrarily

arresting and condemning civilians while the Commission
was in session.

2

Furthermore the delegates were unable to report
on the administration of Justice in police tribunals,
:-.-.{;!

st rates

1

MNKTt*,

m&

Bilttarj courts fet$aSSf of V *lr

inability to examine them.

The Peking authorities refused

to allow the investigation of these tribunals because they

were listed under the Ministry of Interior and thereby

beyond the scope of the Commissioners* lnculries.

The

1.

"Report of the Commission on Extraterritoriality in China
Department of atate , (Washington 1926), p. 82.

2.
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Canton Government was stronger in its refusal.

It would

not receive the Investigating committee on the grounds

that extraterritoriality should be immediately abolished. 1
The report concluded that it was,

"well within

the range of moderation to state that in China at the

present time there is no effective security against

arbitrary action by the military authorities

in so

,

far as such security can be afforded by an effective function-

lng of the Chinese civil and Judicial authorities.

H

2

Having completed its investigation, the Commission

presented recommendations to China and to the Powers holding
extraterritorial privileges in China.

China was advised

to adopt specific measures that would lead to the improvement
of her Judicial system.

The Powers were encouraged to help

China reform the Judiciary along the lines determined by
the Commission and to make feasible modifications in the

extraterritoriality system.
The Commission definitely decided against the

relinquishment of extraterritoriality per se. However, a
stimulus for the gradual relinquishment acknowledged in

1

"America and the Chinese Conflict," Congressio nal Direst
1927-1928 , VI, VII (May, 1927), 150.

2.

China,"
"Report of the Commission of Extraterritoriality in
p. 97.
United States Department of State (Washington, 1926),

90,

1903 and 1922 was produced by the recommendations In the
report.

T.

R.

Pollard has suggested that the recommendations

were a defeat for China on the entire question of extra-

territoriality.

For even if the Powers accepted the

recommendations of the Commission, they still retained the
right of determining if and x^hen these reforms had actually

been carried

out."*"

The report,

then, became what Peking

had expected, a review of the judicial system in China.
of

Meanwhile another

p

aspect/judicial control was

being enacted by China and the Powers.

Because of the

degree of foreign control, it was logical to associate

Mixed Courts in China with Extraterritoriality.

2

The

Powers had violated a treaty right when they seized the
3

3hanghai International Mixed Court in 1911.

Prior to 1911,

foreign and Chinese magistrates on the Court had been

appointed by Chinese authorities, the Shanghai taotal .
The action by the Powers could not be Justified legally, but

they maintained that the seizure had been to insure

administrative efficiency during the Revolution.

However,

foreign control was not surrendered when the Republic was
established.

T.

Pollard, China's Foreign Relations , (New York, 1933),

R.
p.

287.

2.

H.

3.

3.

S.

1.

Qulgley,

"Extraterritoriality in China," p. 55.

Liu, Extraterritoriality: Its Rise and Decline,
(New York, 1925), p. 226.
3.

The Chinese Oov< rnraent had asked the Pollers to

return the Shanghai Mixed Court to its control in 1922.

Reply by the diplomatic body had been postponed because of
the impending convocation of the Extraterritoriality

Commission for it was hoped that this body would decide the
isaue.

Before the Commission met, it was evident that the

representatives of the Powers were anxious for the Court to
be returned to the Chinese.

Though China had taken the

initiative in asking for return, the Powers favored the
grant because foreign control had become a basic cause for

resentment in China and the legal position of the Court was
Isolated.

Foreign administration had become ineffective

because the Court's decisions were not recognized anywhere
else in China.

Hughes warned against a concession re the Mixed
Court that might give the impression of being the first
1

step toward the abolition of extraterritoriality.

However,

Japan and Great Britain had taken a conciliatory attitude
toward rendering the Court to the Chinese and the American
State Department, unwilling to take individual action in
the matter, had agreed to begin negotiations alone those lines.

The Powers reached an agreement to return the

1.
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Shanghai Mixed Court to the Klangsu Provincial Government
in 1926.

The State Department maintained that the

Jurisdiction of the Court was not a treaty right, but had
been determined by an agreement among officials of Great
Britain, China, and the United States in 1869.

Negotiation throughout the years had ended in stalemate

because the Chinese insisted that the reconstituted court
be entirely Chinese, while the foreigners wanted it to

function with the administration of the International
Settlement.

By July, however, both sides agreed upon

terms of rendition and secured the approval of the foreign

legations.
(a)

In plaoe of the Mixed Court in the

International Settlement, Klangsu Provincial
Government will establish Shanghai Provisional
(b) Chinese
Court having similar Jurisdiction,
laws and procedure will be applied except as
the latter shall be modified by mutual agree(c) Assessors to be known as consuls'
ment,
deputies shall function in all cases required
by treaty and In criminal cases 'which directly
affect the peace and order of the International
Settlement." The Powers of the assessors to be
in effect those conferred by the treaty of 1880.
(d) Municipal police shall be detailed to
functions as Judicial police under orders of the
(e) Appeals in Mixed Court civil cases
court.
shall be to Commission r for foreign Affairs and
(f) All Judges to be
the consul concerned
,

1.
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appointed by Kiangsu Provincial Government,
(g) Provision for a final settlement maybe made With any Po Tr er three years hence.
In the ensuing diplomatic struggle for treaty

revision, extraterritoriality assumed a misconstrued

importance.

2

It \*as associated with tariff autonomy,

the detriment of the latter.

MacMurray

sax*

to

through the

combination and was then able to enact a precise American
policy.
Of the two matters that of extraterritoriality
is ruled out by the fact that the Chinese have
not yet such laws or judicial organization as
would enable them to assume the function of
dispensing Justice where foreigners are
It is therefore premature to
defendants.
consider the abandonment of extraterritoriality;
and in view of the importance with which that
subject has artificially been made to assume as
a political slogan among the Chinese it would be
dangerous to broach the subject in any way at
this time. 5
However,

though the abolition of extraterritoriality

was denied, the United States acted in accordance with the
spirit of the Commission's recommendations and granted a

legal right to China.

The Nationalist Government had

1031-1032.
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objected to the presence of consular representatives at
trials in Chinese Courts.*

The United States considered

the protest at once, advised other Powers of its action

and forthwith acquiesced:

....with a view of carrying out the provisions
of the first sentence of section 2 of article 4
of the recommendations contained in the report
of the Commission on Extraterritoriality in
China, purpose (except in unusual circumstances)
to ex rcise the right granted by article 4 of
the Sino-Araerican commercial treaty of 1880
Insofar as relates to an American official
watching proceedings, .... in cases brought by
American plaintiffs against Chinese defendants....
This action by the United States was complete

departure from that in 1922 when Hughes expressed the

American policy re extraterritoriality.

He had wanted the

Commission to meet with the predetermined plan of using the
findings of that body as further proof of the necessity for
any action that the Powefrs might devise to protect foreign
life and property In China.

Accordingly, with this as a

main purpose, the United States was willing to hasten the

convention of the Extraterritoriality Commission.
When Kellogg became Secretary of State, a change
aims,
in our policy, more responsive to Chinese Nationalist

was dlscernable.

H.

3.

Quigley, writing in 1926, condemned
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the Powers

1

treatment of the question of extraterritoriality.

He felt that it was entitled to consideration on its own

merits and should not be determined by oonsideratio m of a

non-Juridioial character.

This was an expression of a

growing opinion in America that demanded treaty revision
along liberal lines.
The Commission admitted the weakness of the

extraterritorial system.

However, it concluded that this

weakness was not so detrimental to the protection of foreign
life and property as Chinese Judicial control would be.

Concerning the Nationalist demand for the abolition of
extraterritoriality, China experienced defeat from the
report of the Copimlssion.

However, tangible gain can be

seen from the establishment of the trend toward gradual

abolition of the privilege based on the recommendations
made in the report.

To illustrate the Intention of the

Powers to practice these recommendations, the United States

immediately complied with the Chinese request that consular

representatives be withdrawn from trials in Chinese Court3.

1.
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CHAPTER

IV,

COMMUNICATIONS

Of all means of communications developments in
China,
study.

the wireless concern will be the subject of this

International competition in this field is

representative of the administrative problem of

communications between Treaty Powers and China.
In a memorandum distributed by the Chinese

delegation to the Washington Conference, "The Chinese
Government ask that the Conference take action that will
lead to the immediate abolition or surrender to the
Chinese Government of all electrical means of communications,

including wireless stations, now maintained on Chinese
soil without the consent of the Chinese Government."

China claimed that she had adequate facilities
for wireless com-nunication and that it was unnecessary for

foreign nations to maintain their own stations.

There were

approximately twenty foreign wireless stations in China
that had been erected by the Powers without the consent
2

of the Chinese Government.

The foreign operation of

wireless was nothing but a political measure representing

1.

"Conference on the Limitation of Armament," Sen te
Documents , vol. X, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington, 1922),
p.

2.

505.

Ibid., p. 506.
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an Infringement on China's administrative and territorial

integrity.
When the Conference discussed the Chinese

memorandum, two claims were considered; (1) that a

distinction be drawn between official and commercial
messages and (2) that the question of wave lengths be

regulated by mutual agreement.

1

Hughes, as did other

representatives, told the Conference that the United States

maintained wireless stations only to the extent provided
in the Boxer protocol of 1901, i.e. in connection with
troop stations and to keep communications open to the sea.

2

The United States agreed with the Chinese Government that
the legation stations should be used for official business

only and not for commercial purposes.

The importance of

wireless communication lay in the fact that there were only
a limited number of wave lengths available.

The United

States had added the discussion of wireless to the agenda
in an effort to apply international co-operation to the

problem.

Because of the highly complicated technical aspect

of wireless, the delegates agreed not to proceed with the

subject of wave lengths beyond a practical point.

0
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The subject of wireless stations in Chin* was
then referred to a subcommittee which reported a general

resolution of five parts.

By unanimous agreement it was

decided to apply the principle of the Open Door to the
fourth part of this resolution.
(4) Questions regarding radio stations in

leased areas will be discussed by the
Chinese Government and the Government
concerned.^
Mr.

Sze of the Chinese delegation declined the

suggestion of a special commission to study wireless
telegraphy.

In China, wire telegraphy w*s a government

monopoly and for this reason China would rather regard it
as purely Internal policy.

The Chinese delegate added that

the Resolution adopted had been the policy of eight Powers

and thnt China's policy was as follows:
The Chinese delegation takes tills occasion
formally to declare that the Chinese Government
does not recognize or concede the right of any
foreign power or of the nationals thereof to
install or operate, without its express consent,
radio stations in legation grounds, settlements,
concessions, leased territories, railway areas
or other similar areas.

1.
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The committee of communications experts then

concluded with recommendations which American, British,
French, and Japanese radio interests could follow but the

Conference did not take decisive action regarding wireless
communication.

French and Japanese co-operative scheme
of private radio interests with the consent of
China; no monopoly or exclusive privilege and
subject to Chinese laws; complete station near
Peking (Mitsui).

(1) British,

(2) American expert plan for trans-Pacific service
to be Chinese-American entity based on the Federal

Telegraph Company concession.
(3)

Traffic arrangements to carry out provisions (1)
and (2) to be at liberty of governments concerned.

(4)

Chinese Ministry of Coflimuni cations to authorize
foreign stations that handle ship to shore
coramuni cati ons

(5)

China National Wireless Telegraph Company to
extend its scope for best development of resources
in China; prevent monopoly and conflict in China.

(6) Four cowers reco.amend that arrangement be made with
cable companies to continue same rates for a period
after expiration of existing contracts in 19o0.1

While the Conference was in session competition

among international radio Interests In China was progressing.
to an
The American State Department had made a committment

108.

American wireless concern in 1921.

That year, the

Federal Telegraph Company, Incorporated in California,

had signed a contract with the Peking Government
providing
for the construction of a radio station in Shanghai
with

secondary stations at Canton, Harbin, and Peking for wireless overseas communication.
The American Legation had asked for Department

support of the Federal contract because it felt that it

might conflict with Marconi (British), Mitsui (Japanese),
and other monopolistic cable agreements.

The State

Department, opposed to monopolies In China, had received

assurances that the Federal contract was not monopolistic
nor a hindrance to equal opportunity.

Department gave its support.

Accordingly the

There was another reason for

diplomatic support of the Federal contraot.

The American

Government wanted control of direct communication between
the United States and China and planned to use the Federal

Company^ concession to carry

It out.

To help finance the Federal concession, the State

Department persuaded the Radio Corporation of America to
lend financial assistance.

1

The Radio Corporation had given

support to a scheme for international control that had been

1.
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advanced at the Conference but expressed willingness to
meet the wishes of the State Department concerning trans-

pacific communications.

The two companies proposed to

set up a new company to execute the China contract of the

Federal Company.

Both the Federal Company and the Radio

Corporation would have an equal share In the control of
the new company.

The Telegraph Company and the Radio

Corporation both knew that the State Department would not
determine the legality or commercial value of the project,
but they wanted the assurance of diplomatic support.

The

State Department had passed on the Federal contract in
1921 and it now repeated a warning against the creation of
a monopoly by the Radio Corporation in the ensuing

transaction.

The Navy Department, also, evidenced interest

in the concern.

It was anxious for the Federal Telegraph

Company to retain its identity to assure the continuation
of the manufacture and sale of certain apparatus.

1

Such

precautionary measures would indicate that the American
Government was opposed to the scheme for either a wireless

combination or a private monopoly in China.
The American Minister and the Peking Ministry of

Communications urged the State Department to make the

1.
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Federal Company hasten in the execution of its contract

because the British, French, and Japanese wireless

interests had informed China in 1922 that they would soon
present an agreement that they had reached on a wireless
policy.

Meanwhile the Radio Corporation and the Federal

Company were carrying on negotiations in strict secrecy

because of the Radio Corporation's close affiliations with
the international radio concerns.

2

However, in October the

Japanese filed protest against the Federal contract on the
basis of the monopolistic clause in their Mitsui contract

which enabled them to establish and operate all overseas
radio service in China to the exclusion of all other

nationals interested in wireless communication.
This protest carried enough weight to cause the

Peking Ministry of Communications to refuse to sanction the
Federal Company's negotiations with the Radio Corporation
on the grounds that: (1) a Parliamentary attack would

probably result if public opinion decided that the Ministry
had made a new contract; and (2) the Japanese objection.
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China in the face of international pressure was
reverting
to a policy of delay.

Schwerin, President of the Federal

Company, told the State Department that within two months
the land near Shanghai selected for the radio station

would be flooded for the rice crop, and that he believed
that the Chinese authorities were fully aware that work

would then be impossible for the remainder of the year. 1

Reacting to China's delay, the United States

announced that it supported the Federal contract on the
principle of the Open-Door because it concerned, "the

Interpretation to be given to the principle of equality of
commercial and industrial opportunity in China,...
However, the State Department had to

fee

2

the additional

complication of international interests in the Federal
Company's contract.
The Powers who were trying to form the radio

consortium for China first had to dispose of the Mitsui
claim and the Federal contract.

Hughes considered the

advisability of entering an agreement among American,
British, French, and Japanese radio interests on the basis
of the experts' recommendation s at the Washington Confex^en oe.
1.
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Tills

plan reserved the Chinese-American field as an entity

to be developed through the Federal Contract and thus

trans-Pacific control by the United States would be
insured.

Hughes thought that our entrance in the

consortium would facilitate the execution of Federal
contract.

When the British asked him if the United 3tates

would meet the Japanese objections to the recommend ations
of the experts, he replied that "while not unwilling that

its nationals should co-operate by means of appropriate

traffic agreements and other business arrangements with any

international combination which might be established for
the development of radio communications between China and

other countries, it is not prepared to become a party to
a combination for that purpose, desiring in particular to

retain independence of action with respect to communications

between the United States and China.

1,1

Thus he carefully

indicated that our entrance, if at all, would be carefully
China had not given its opinion on the

qualified.

consortium, and Hughes tried to enact a policy that seemingly

agreed with the Chinese desires.
The Japanese Government had objected to the

opinion of the American experts in regard to the execution

1.
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of the Federal contract.

Japanese propaganda went into

action to demand that the Chinese (Jovernment cancel the
contract.

The Japanese (Mitsui) station was in financial

straits and had been anxious for the Federal Company to
buy up its concession.

Sohwerin did not believe that his

company could buy out the Hitsui and feared that if they

tried to unite the two the Japanese would insist upon
sharing the stations.**"

That arrangement would endanger

American control of trans-Pacific communication.

Failing

in this respect, the Japanese presented a counter proposal
th.t the principles of consortium be applied to the Mitsui

and Federal contracts.

2

In this way, the contracts would

be pooled and superceded by a loan agreement for wireless,

comparable to the railway loans.
The Department felt that it might have to look
to the Japanese proposal as the only alternative if the

Radio Corporation and the Federal Company did not setf.e
3

an internal dispute and complete their original scheme.

Disturbed conditions within the American interests caused

p. 571.
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Hughes to further reconsider his attitude toward the
consortium.

Before such a course became imminent, however,

the United States presented a plan for the mutual trans-

mission of traffic between the Federal and Mitsui stations.
Japan called this traffic proposal a breach of China's

administrative integrity and unfair treatment of the other
Powers concerned.

She held that it violated the Mitsui

contract and Indicated that the Federal Company would have

exclusive control of all radio stations to be constructed
by the company as well as control of radio service between
the United States and China.

The Peking Government now took a defensive-

position by informing both the United States and Japan
that they would hafe to adjust their differences before
2

China could consider fulfillment of the Federal contract.
In such action Kellogg saw the repudiation of the oontract

and violation of the Open- Door principle.

The Chinese

Minister for Foreign Affairs denied that a question of

principle was involved.

He declared it was simply

practical matter of overcoming the
However,

ft

Japanese objection.

shortly after the Peking Government gave erery
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evidence of cancelling both the American and Japanese
contracts.

There was little consolation for the Federal

Company to know that the Mitsui contract would also be
cancelled.

For by the terms of the Japanese contract,

the Peking station would remain in Japanese hands because

construction had been completed.

1

The cancellation was

carried through at a secret cabinet meeting August 24,
1920.
The Peking Government immediately after

cancellation proposed a Joint Anerl can- Japanese loan to
the Chinese Government to develop its wireless system.

The American representatives felt that Japanese interest

behind the proposal to draw the Anur leans from vested
contract rights into negotiation in which they might be at
2

a disadvantage.

The Chinese Government had not answered

l-acMurray's request for a statement on the contr ct, and

until it was forthcoming the American Government refused to
The quick action of the
s
contract.
Federal
American Minister saved the

recognize the cancellation.

The Peking Mini ter told Kellogg that 'laoMurray

had sent his government a comraunic tion that was interpreted

1.

Foreign delations , 1925,

2.

Ibid .

,

p.

919.

3.

Ibid.

,

p.

920.

I,

p.

915.
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as meaning that the action of the United States in the

coning Special Conference would be governed by the

attitude of the Chinese Government toward the Federal

Wireless contract.*

Kellogg agreed with MacMurray and

expressed his Governments disappointment in China's

disregarding the policy of the Op en- Do or.

China, he

pointed out, was failing to support the policy at the same
time that she was appealing to the Powers to release her

from conventional tariffs and extraterritorial treaties.
Some opinion in Peking regarded our insistence on the

Cpen-Door policy as mere bluff.

The State Department,

though determined to have the Federal contract recognized,
did not want the particular problem to become a focus for
2

our general policy in China.
The Peking Government acceded to the desire of
the United States but only as an emergency measure in the

light of two evils.

President Tuan assured MacMurray that

the contract would be upheld.

0

Tuan expressed his

Governments adherence to the principle of the Open- Door

1.

Foreign Relations , 1925,

2.

Ibid.

,

3.

Loc.

olt.

p.

927.

I,

p.

922.

*

11?

but he recognized the potential threat of Japan In

Manchuria and felt that he had to appease it. 1

He

suggested a tripartite conversation to fulfill the Federal
contract and to assure Japan that the Shanghai station
•ould not Interfere with the Japanese system of Bjnral radio

communications.

The American Government informed Peking

that it would enter discussion when the Federal contract

was in course of performance.
The State Department was anxious to conclude
this long standing controversy but held out for its

original terms.

Kellogg was impressed with the argument

that the proposed radio consortium would alleviate financial

disability in connection with wireless In China.

"ac 'urray

informed his chief that he thought the real point of
Japanese opposition to the expert*
this,

s

recommendations was

"they would prefer China to be served by a station

under their control though it is inadequate for trans-

Pacific work, rather than have an adequate station built
2

near Shanghai by Americans or any other nationality.

MacMurray in conversation with Saburl, Japanese
dele ate to the Tariff Conference, queried

1

.

;?.

L oc.

clt .
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,

1926,

I,

p.

1044.

hlia

as to why
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his Government was vitally Interested In a oomraerclal
enterprise.

1

He answered that there was some opinion in

Japan that the American Navy«s interest in the Federal

contract was concerned with a view to future war with
Japan.

Upon denial of amour propre by the United States

the Japanese delegate implied a willingness to reconsider
the American proposal for a traffic arrangement between the
2

American and Japanese stations.

Saburi declared that

the question had formerly been studied from the political

rather than from the economic point of view.

Thus a point

seemed to have been reached where accord might evolve and
the consortium plan which had not been accepted by the

Chinese could be discarded.
The Chinese Government had never replied to the
3
A definite statement, then,
Japanese consortium proposal.

might have directed the course of the dispute.

satisfaction was seen on all sides.

J.

Radio Corporation appealed to Kellogg.

1.

Foreign Relations, 1926,

2.

Ibid .

3.

Ibid., p. 1051.
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I,

p. 1044.
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Now dis-

Harbord of the

t
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....It is unnecessary, possibly unprsteful, to
reiterate our hope that the State Department
will push this matter to a conclusion at a very
early date,. Our loyalty to its position on the
"Open- Do or has cost us elrendy half a million
dollars in money paid out which sum is increasing
by a little less than -$9,000 esch month.
q are
quite convinced that a consortium for wireless
communication in China would be very much better
for China than no wireless communication at all.
We very much appreciate the psrnest sun or
which our Federal project has in the past had
from the State Deportment and respectfully urge
that there be no relaxation in such support.
We do feel, however, that the moment that the
State Department becomes convinced that there
is no liklihoori of the Chinese poing forward with
our contract, no political objection to a
consortium should be allowed to stsnd in the way
of our naklng arrangements as have been open to
us for a lonp time.-*-

Upon the advice of 14acMurray, the American
Government proceeded with caution in requesting China for
a reply concerning the federal contract.

Open- Door policy in toto.

2

He stressed the

For the Chinese Government, in

its present Nationalistic frame of mind, would never grant

another contract as favorable as the Federal contract.'"
reklng, however, did not respond.

Relations , 19^6,

1.
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2.
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The British Government viewed the Federal

contract as a monopoly of the same type as the Mitsui.
They specifically objected to China

1

s

pledging the whole

of the surplus revenues of the Chinese Railways as security
for the loan contract. 1 The general tenor of the British

protest was that the individual action of the United States
was oontravenous to its declared policy in 1918 concerning

consortium investment in China.

The British memorandum

quoted a note from the United States sent to the British,
French, and Japanese October 8, 1918.
The proposal Of the United States contemplated
that industrial, as well as administrative loans
should be Included in the new arrangement for the
reason that, in practise, the line of demarcation
between various classes of loans often is not
easy to draw. Both alike are essential fields
for legitimate financial enterprise and both alike
should be removed from the sphere of unsound
speculation and of destructive competition. The
intention of this Government was to suggest as a
means to that end, that the Interested Governments
should, by common consent, endeavor so to broaden
the member ship in the newly formed national groups
that all financial firms of good standing interested
in such loans might be Included in the respective
groups and should withhold their support from
independent financial operations without previous
agreement of the interested Governments.

Our support of the Federal contract and refusal to sanction
the consortium of radio interests denied this note.

1.

Foreign Relations

2.

Ibid., p. 1071.

,

1926,

I,

p.

1070.
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The Peking Government inferred to MaoMurray

that It might honor the Federal contract in exchange for

an early recognition of its regime. 1

Macllurray refused

this offer, possibly because it might interfere with his

negotiations with the Canton regime concerning a tariff
treaty.

He felt that the Peking refusal to acquiesce on

the grounds of the Open-Door principle meant a complete

denial of the Federal contract and thus urged his Depart-

ment to negotiate with Sun Ch'uan-fang who controlled
Shanghai.

2

Kellogg refused this suggestion because he

felt that ultimate fulfillment of the radio contract would

need the support of the Central Government at Peking.

3

In regard to policy for private enterprise, Kellogg did

not follow MacMurray's opinions as willingly as he did
for tariff and extraterritoriality policies.

Portly after,

the Department replied to the

Japanese invitation to enter the consortium.

The United

States maintained its original stand against the consortium
and for the traffic arrangement between the Federal and

1.

ForelRn delations , 1926,

3.

Ibid., p. 1077.

I,

pp. 1077-1078.

122.

:'itsui

stations.

Our note proposed a conference of
u

Chinese, Japanese, and American radio representatives to

meet in New York to arrange a solution of the present
difficulties.
'chat

1

However, the United States did not consider

the proposed conference -^ould be an excuse for further

delay by Peking In executing the Federal contract.

Japanese delayed answering the American
request for the r-tiio conference and this delay caused the
Chinese to withhold acceptance and the Radio Corporation
to consider withdrawing its support of the Federal Company.

The United States tried to convince Japan that,

*it ought

to be possible for governments to allow the private

corporations who were ^oing to be connected with the

operation of radio between China and Japan and the United
States to get to-gether as private individuals for the

purpose of finding some plan of operation and of agreeing
among them -elves on how they could carry out their

proposals,...."

3
tfiMMB

the

>rlvate interests had agreed

upon a plan it would then be time for the Governments

concerned to consider whether or not they would approve of

1082.

1.
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plan sr-reed upon.
Jfman presented B memorandum of their opinion as

the solution of the wireless problem, November 1927, which

proposed cancellation of both Mitsui and federal contracts.
(1) Japan and the United states voluntarily cancel
Mitsui anrt Feflpral contracts.
(2)

China establish her own station at Shanghai
Federal Telegraph Company supply material.

(3)

China make loan contracts to Japanese and
American companies.

(4)

China fniarantee not to ^rant any foreign country
or its nationals, exclusive right of operation
of wireless telegraphy in China.

(6) Tri- Government Conference to make detailed
arrangements on first four proposals.

The American (Government did not sanction the

Japanese pronosal but offered to let the American radio

interests decide its value for themselves.

"

*&€ Stnte

Department merely stipulated that the right of controlling
direct communication between the United States and China
and the denial of a r^dlo monopoly should be Maintained.
The Department expected the American interests to uphold

these stipulations at the proposed trl-partite conference

1.

Foreign Rein t ions , 1927, II,

2.
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,

p.
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472.
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when it convened.

TVrever, letting the American interests

accept or reject the Japanese proposal which specifically

denied the Federal contract constituted tacit diplomatic

withdrawal of the support of the Federal Telegraph
Company.
In the development of International competition
to secure wireless contracts in China during this period

the main issues at stake were never clearly defined.

The

A.^.rlc&n State Department had given support to the Federal

telegraph Company in 1921 before wireless telep; r ephy was

dlfcusced at the Washington Conference.

W.

W.

Willoughby

maintained that nothing much was done in regard to wirelees
communication in 1922.

In this stud",

the recommendations

that the experts presented at Washington are basic aspects
of the wireless controversy.

The State Department expressed

willingness to enter the radio consortium on the be sis of
the

e

recon nendr-tions but Japanese objections defeated any

intentions it might have had toward entering the consortium.
After the Washington Conference the United States

had to f ce the conflict between continuing the support of
the Federal concession and of opposing the radio consortium

because the Peking Government; did not give its approval.

1.

'.

Villouehby, China at the Conference

1922), p. 157.

(Baltimore,
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The conflict was heightened by trouble Within the

American r<3dio interests.

The Federal Company, badked by

the State Department, was unable to work in accord with

the Radio Corporation which had decided leanings toward
the International radio consortium.

Anxious to end the long controversy, the State
Department adopted the policy of allowing private radio

interests in Japan, the United States, and China to
negotiate with the Chinese Government.

The constructive

work of the Department in regard to the wireless controversy
was the f at that the

An*

rican Government supported its

national's contract until 19H7 when the chances that China
would soon have a stable government wore practically
certain.

withdrawal of diplomatic support of the Federal

contract was virtual recognition of China 1 s autonomous right
to wireless control.

State Department action during the wireless

oontroversy was In keeping with American foreign policy of
the era.

"Dollar Diplomacy"

terminated in Latin America.

i-ras

In the process of being

Mexico and Nicaragua experienced

internal stability from effective moral support by the

United states.

±he American public was becoming anti-

imperialistic and demanded that its government treat all
nation a as equals.
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CHAPTER

V.

CONCLUSION

Since 1842 China had had only nominal control
of many of her administrative functions.

Actually foreign

governments and their nationals had maintained control by
treaty rights and private contracts.

Though the foreign

control of the tariff, courts, and communications differs
in degree,

B

semblance of similarity is dlscernable in a

study of the problems from 1922-1928.
All three problems were discussed at the

Washington Conference, though in the light of China's
requests little specific action was taken in 1922.

Provisions was made for special conferences to consider
the questions of China's tariff and Judicial system.

A technical group presented recommendations for consideration among international wireless interests in China.

China took the initiative at the Conference in

presenting her ten points for procedure.

Defeated when the

Powers adopted the Root Resolutions as blanket policy,
China persistently made clear to the representatives just

what her ambitions and desires were in regard to these

administrative problems.

The Chinese delegation asked for

tariff autonomy, wireless control, and immediate action
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toward the eventual relinquishment of extraterritoriality.
It is Interesting to note the divergent view of

the meaning of administrative and territorial integrity.

China declared at Washington that the problems in this
study constituted administrative integrity.

The Powers

agreed to uphold that Integrity but did not take measures
to guarantee it other than announcing integrity in

principle.
China gradually became strong enough to persuade
the United States to grant tariff autonomy in 1928.

And

although she failed to gain complete control of her courts
and communications, she had established a precedent which
should, it would seem, ultimately lead her to this control.
In gaining tariff autonomy, China was aided by

the American Minister J. V. A. MacMurray who has not

received the credit and recognition due him for the part
he played in American diplomacy at this time.

However,

from the State Department correspondence it is evident
that MacMurray guided the entire course of diplomacy which

prevented the United States from recognizing a Chinese
Government controlled by militarism or one influenced by
Communism.
The evidence would suggest that China would not
for
have gained tariff autonomy in 1928 if it had not been

128.

the Chinese Nationalist Movement.

The Nationalist's

note to MacMurray condemning the ill-conceived American

policy, carried more diplom tic weight for the success
of tariff autonomy than the Peking regime's threat to

abrogate all customs treaties at the Special Tariff
Conference.

A thought might be well advanced that China
would not have gained tariff autonomy if

the:"e

civil war caused by the Nationalist agitation.

faction continuously planned a return to the

had been no
The Southern

po:-r er

it had

given up in 1912 and stimulated civil war throughout the

post-Revolutionary period to attain it.

1

The Nationalist

military victory contributed to the recognition of Nanking
by the United States.

For it seems certain from this

study that MacMurray would have awaited developments much

longer if necessary and that he would never grant tariff

autonomy to a Peking Government representing China but

influenced by Japan and ifeakened by military anarohy.
Of the three demands made by China concerning

administration, tariff autonomy was the only one granted
in 1928 because it was used as the reward for the establish-

ment of the Nanking Government.

1.

In the civil strife bet\*een

Morse and H. F. MacNalr, Far Easte rn International
Relations (Cambridge, 1931), p. 670.
H.

B.
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the North and South, both side3 wanted tariff autonomy

and the resulting increase in revenue much more than

control of courts and communications.
The policy of International co-operation among
,Powers in China was never strictly maintained.

The

United States made efforts to abide by it in principle
and practise until 1925.

Treaty revision with China alone

was contemplated after that because of the dissention

among the Covers.

However, in 1927 the United States was

willing to depart from the co-operative scheme for a new
reason.

Kellogg feared that an identic note to apply

sanctions against the Nationalists for the Nanlsing outrage

would be detrimental to the strength of the moderate
element in the Party.

It was this moderate Nationalist

faction with whom the American Government wanted to

negotiate a customs treaty of equality and reciprocity.
When this plan was acted upon in 1928 the co-operative

policy immediately became obsolete.

Professor Toynbee declared that the Nine Power
Treaty of the Washington Conference became obsolete when

Kellogg failed to mention it in his statement of January
27,

1927.

1.

CP.

1

Nor did the United States inform the other

Howl and, Survey of American Fo-eiftn R e l"Ur,na
(New Haven, 1930), p. 142.

,
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Washington Conference members of Its intention
to grant
tariff autonomy to China until the day before
the treaty
1
was signed.
There Is a general theory that a line of

continuity exists in the American Far Eastern Policy.
It-

is an expression of idealism built upon the expectation

of commercial expansion.

The interest of the State

Department followed American enterprise in China.

However,

largely from the progressive diplomacy of American statesmen,
the policy of helping China establish a strong efficient

government became a separate entity.
John Marshall, American Minister in 1853, stated
the ideal thusly:

It is my opinion that the highest interest of
the United States are involved In sustaining

—

China maintaining order here, and gradually
engrafting on this worn out stock the healthy
principles which give life and health to
governments rather than to see China become
the theater of widespread anarchy and
g
ultimately the prey of European ambition.

John Hay, imbued with the idea of commercial
•

enterprise in China, announced the Open-Door policy and
1

'

1

'
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.
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2.

Mor3e, and H. P. MacNair, Far Sastern International
Relations, r>. 174.
H.
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bro ight forth Hie moral obligation fir3t stated by John
Marshall, of preserving the territorial and administrative

integrity of China.

Wllsonian idealism found expression

in China when the American banking group withdrew from
the Six Power Consortium and again at Paris when America

tried to uphold China's Shantung claim at the Pe;;ce
Conference.

Kellogg* 3 moral influence doctrine picked

up the thread of Idealism.
Gov> rnraent by the

Recognition of the Nanking

United States was a source of strength

enabling China to assume a position of equality among

nations of the world.
The Japanese diplomacy of this period presents

thought for contemplation.

The Japanese were quite

obviously using obstructionist tactics at the Tariff
Conference in the matter of implementing the proposed

Washington sur taxes.
Company

1

a

%aln,

the Federal Telegraph

contract failed to go into effect largely because

of Japanese Influence at Peking and in the international

radio concern.

The results of this study would seem to

indicate that the United States felt that Japanese

influence in Northern China was as detrimental to the
establishment of a representative Chinese Oov rnment as
the Communistic control in the South.

132.

In evaluating evidence,

it could be assumed

that the United States neutralized the Japanese

successful influence over Chinese administration by

supporting the banking Government which was violently
anti-Japanese.
in China

lias

The ultimate result of fo ei^n control

not been decided as yet.

The problems

treated here were merely part of a movement that
exists to-day.

In brief it is the strug-gle to

establish territorial and administrative sovereignty
in China.
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APPENDIX
CHRONOLOGY

OF

THk

I.

CHINESE

REVOLUTION *

October 30, 1911

Formal Beginning

January 1, 1912

Inauguration of Sun Yat-sen as Provisional
President of China at banking.

February 12, 1912

Abdication of Manchus and Succession of
Yuan Shi-K^ai at Peking.

1912 - 1916

Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'alst Peking.

1916 - 1917

Presidency of Li Yuan-hung at Peking.

1917 - 1918

Presidency of Feng Kuo-chang at teking

1918 - 1922

Presidency of Hu Shlh-chang at Poking.

1922 - 1923

Second Presidency of Ki Yuan-hung at Peking.

1923 - 1924

Presidency of Tao Kun at Peking;.

1924 - 1926

Provisional Government of Taun Chi-jui
at Peking.

1926 - 1928

Dictatorship of Chang Tso-lin at Peking

From:

A.

N.

Holcombe, The Chinese Revolution (Cambridge,

1931), p. 390.
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1917 - 1925

Independent Revolutionary Government of
3un Yat-3en at Canton.

1925 - 1926

Nationalist Government at Canton.

1926 - 1927

Nationalist Government at Hankow.

1927 - 1928

Nationalist Government at Nanking.

1928 -

Presidency of Chiang K'ai-shek at
Nanking.

.
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APPENDIX

II.

RECOMMENDATION OP THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
EXTRATERR ITORIAL I TY*
I.

The administration of Justice with respect to the

civilian population in China must be entrusted to a Judiciary
which shall be effectively protected against any unwarranted

interference by the executive or other branches of the
Government, whether civil or military.
II.

The Chinese Government should adopt the following

program for the improvement of the existing Itgali Judicial
and prison systems of China:

1.

It should consider Parts II and III of this report

relating to the laws and to the Judicial, police,
and prison systems, with a view to making such

amendments and taking such action as may be
necessary to meet the observations they made.

2.

It should complete and put into force the

following laws:
(1) Civil code.

of the Commission on Extraterritoriality in China,
Peking September 16, 1926" United States Department of State

"Report

(Washington, 1926)

.
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(2) Commercial code (including negotiable

instruments laws, maritime law and
insurance law).
(3) Revised criminal code.
(4) Banking law.

(5) Bankruptcy law.
(6) Patent law.
(7) Land expropriation law.
(8) Law concerning notaries public.

3.

It should establish and maintain a uniform system

for the regular enactment, promulgrtion and

reclssion of laws, so that there may be no uncertainty
as to the laws of China.

4.

It should extend the system of modern courts, modern

prisons and modern detention-houses with a view
to the elimination of the magistrates* courts and
of the old-style prisons and detention-house

5.

I

It should make adequate financial provision for

the maintenance of courts, detention houses and

prisons and their personnel.
III.

It is suggested that, prior to the reasonable

compliance with all the recommendations above

137.

mentioned

taut

have been

c

After the principal Items thereof

rried out, the powers concerned, If

so desired by the Chinese Government, Bight

consider the abolition of extraterritoriality

according to such proves l^e scheme (whether

geographic a, partial, or otherwise) as may be
agreed upon.

IV.

Pending the abolition of extraterritoriality, the
Governments of the powers oon corned should consider Part
of this report with

m

de,

a

I

view to meeting the observations they

and with the oo operation of tne Chinese Government

wherever neoessary, should make certain modifications in
the existing systems and pr-ctlse of extraterritoriality

as follows:

1.

Application of Chinese Laws
The powers oonoerned should administer, so far

as practicable, in their extraterritorial or consular courts

such laws and regulations of China as thev ma v deeL1 11
.

proper to adopt.

133

2.

illxed Gases and Mixed Courts

As a general rule mixed cases between nationals
of the powers concerned as plaintiffs and persons under

Chinese Jurisdiction as defendants should be tried bef 9 e
the modern Chinese courts (3hen P»an ?»lng) without the

presence of a foreign assessor to watch the proceedings or
otherwise participate.

With regard to the existing special

mixed courts, their organization and procedure should, as
far as the special conditions in the settlements and

concessions warrant, be brought more into accord with the

organization and procedure of the mod. rn Chinese Judicial
system.

Lawyers who are nationals of extraterritorial

powers and who are qualified to appear before the extraterritorial or consular courts should be permitted, subject
to the laws

.and

regulations governing Chinese lawyers, to

represent clients, foreign or Chinese, in all mixed oases.
No examination should be required as a qualification for

practice in such oases.

3.

Nationals of gxtra territorial Powers
(a) The extraterritorial powers should correct certain

abuses which have arisen through the extension of

foreign protection to Chinese as well as to business
and shipping interests the actual ownership of which
is wholly or mainly Chinese.

139

(b)

Tiie

extraterritorial powers which do not now

require compulsory periodical registration of
their nationals

in.

China should make provision

for such registration at definite Intervals.

4.

Judicial Assistance

Necessary arrangements should be made in regard
to Judicial assistance (including coiaLiissions rogatoires)

between the Chinese authorities and the authorities of the
extraterritorial powers and between the authorities of
the extraterritorial power! themselves, e.g.

:

(a) All agreements between foreigners and persons under

Chinese Jurisdiction which provide for the settlement
of civil matters by arbitration should be recognized,

and the awards made in pursuance thereof should be
enforced, by the extraterritorial or consular courts
In the oase of persons under their Jurisdiction,

except when in the opinion of the competent court,
the decision is contrary to public order or good

morals.
(b) Satisfactory arrangements should be made between

the Chinese Government and the powers concerned

140.

for the prompt execution of judgments, sumnonses and

warrants of arrest or search, concerning persons under
Chinese Jurisdiction, duly issued by the Chinese courts

and certified by the competent Chinese authorities

and vice versa.

5.

Taxation

Pending the abolition of extraterritoriality,
the nationals of the powers concerned should be required
to pay such taxes as may be prescribed in laws regulations

duly promulgated by the competent authorities of the Chinese

Government and recognized by the poweVi concerned as

applicable to their nationals.

c

:
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